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 A rising China and a changing physical environment is forever altering existing 
Arctic governance systems. Using China’s emergence as a self-described “Near Arctic” 
state as a guide, this thesis advances a theory that exclusionary practices by states and 
international organizations towards emerging actors in regions experiencing rapid 
globalization results in the unintended construction of peripheral influence systems led by 
the excluded. This concept is summarized as exclusion-peripheralization. In the process 
of highlighting the spectrum of China’s developing Arctic ascendancy, several sub-
themes inherent to contemporary Arctic geopolitics are also examined. 1) How science or 
knowledge-based ‘territory’ supplants traditional concepts of territorial-based legitimacy 
in international governance systems like the Arctic Council. 2) The role political 
anthropology plays as both contextual foundation and strategic tool in the interactions 
between established and emerging states. 3) The cyclic process whereby a ‘new’ region 
become increasingly international, how globalization in turn acts upon that space, and 
how state policy creation systems are themselves altered. Each of these factor into an 
enduring Arctic motif as a region of complex and oft-conflicting interests, specifically of 
exploitation versus sustainability and competition versus cooperation. Exclusion-
peripheralization theory and these sub-themes are approached via the presentation of case 
studies on Sino-Nordic, Inuit, and Russian collaboration, in addition to commentary on 
the larger strategic backdrop, including United States policy and the influence of 
“transnational knowledge networks.”1 This thesis concludes China’s Arctic activities, 
                                                 
1 Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, “The International Political Systemic Context of Arctic Marine Resource 
Governance,” in Arctic Marine Resource Government and Development, ed. Niels Vestergaard, Brooks A. 




exemplified by its investment in polar science, infrastructure and trade development 
agreements with individual Arctic states, as well as other forms of norm-construction, are 
designed to establish a lasting, albeit non-territorial Chinese Arctic presence. This work 
concludes with policy recommendations, including commentary on the potential 
establishment of a new international Arctic governance regime, loosely modeled after the 
Antarctic Treaty; the use of political anthropology to enhance Arctic diplomatic 
engagement strategies; and from a U.S. perspective, the use of exclusion-
peripheralization to maintain advantage in an evolving Arctic geopolitical environment. 
 Advisor — Dorothea Wolfson, Ph.D. 
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“True civilization will not have been reached until all nations see that it is nobler 
to conquer nature than to conquer each other.”2 The romanticized words of the famed late 
19th century Norwegian Arctic explorer Fridtjof Nansen capture the enduring promise and 
tragedy of the Arctic. On one hand, a potential common forum offering unprecedented 
opportunities for cooperation, on the other, a region to be overcome and exploited. Until 
roughly the period of Nansen’s expeditions across Greenland, the high north was marked 
as an impassable or even a fantastical region as depicted in Gerardo Mercator’s 1595 
print of an imagined temperate polar sea.3 Previous centuries’ explorers pursued 
campaigns to conquer nature, seeking lucrative trade networks in Asia by charting often 
deadly courses to find the Northwest Passage or a corridor around the ice-flanked 
Northern Sea Route. Their activities forever connected exploration, science, commerce, 
and state strategy with the Earth’s poles. Sub-Arctic human conflicts and other security-
related and competitive commercial activities also affected the Arctic dating from 
Europe’s medieval period, and most notably during the Cold War.4 These further shaped 
Western Arctic ideologies, imparting lasting perspectives on competition and threat 
perception. However, those taken with the Arctic’s stark beauty, unique ecosystems, and 
later advocacy for its indigenous peoples also continued to advance the idea that the 
Arctic might serve to enhance liberal institutions and stewardship. All of these ideals live 
on in the establishment of international systems of environmental governance and multi-
                                                 
2
 Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 9, ProQuest 
Ebook Central. 
3
 Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 6.  
4 Bertelsen, “The International Political Systemic Context of Arctic Marine Resource Governance,” 6. 
 
 2 
disciplinary, transnational dialogues. Nansen’s statement thus continues to resonate 
within the 21st century’s Arctic geopolitical environment, concepts of cooperation and 
self-interest, and attitudes towards the region’s resource potential. Ironically, due to 
climate change, the long-sought connection between Asia and the West is occurring in 
the Arctic, but in terms not quite anticipated or imagined. 
This thesis details China’s rise as a self-professed “Near Arctic”5 state and 
analyzes the spectrum of geopolitical change its entrance into the far north’s diplomatic 
systems engenders. In the process, this thesis contributes to existing international 
relations theories tailored to the Arctic, advances larger analysis on China’s global rise, 
and offers policy direction for a rapidly changing Arctic region. China’s modern 
connections with the West and with Eurasia come at a time when the Arctic has 
increasing come under international focus due to climate change. Thus, beyond simply 
cataloguing China’s advancing Arctic strategic agenda, the following three chapters 
intend to further several themes inherent to emerging inter-state dynamics in the Arctic. 
Foremost among these is a theory that exclusionary practice by states or international 
organizations (IO) towards emerging actors in regions experiencing rapid globalization 
results in unintended construction of peripheral influence systems, led by the excluded. 
This concept is summarized throughout this thesis as exclusion-peripheralization. 
China’s pursuit of Arctic statehood serves as this thesis’s primary guide to understanding 
exclusion-peripheralization, but the aim is to further a wider application to other global 
frontiers, including conceptual or scientific “regions.” 
                                                 
5
 People’s Republic of China State Council Information Office, “China’s Arctic Policy,” January 2018, 




The exclusion-peripheralization causality is aided by sub-themes underlining the 
means by which extra-regional states like China use to establish roles in new influence 
regions. First, new regional actors may wield an often-symbiotic relationship between 
science and commerce rather than attempting to establish their own sovereign territorial 
holdings. In several contexts that will be explored, state engineering of international 
leadership outside traditional sovereign territorial boundaries and the means in which this 
is enacted has been alternately labeled as “flexible regional,”6 “science diplomacy,”7 
“cognitive territory,”8 or “techno-politics.”9 Further transnational leadership comes in the 
form of participation in “epistemic communities,” wherein a diverse cast of multi-
disciplinary experts or stakeholders, some serving as state policy interlocutors, referred to 
as “knowledge brokers” by Karen Litfin, routinely convene to discuss global challenges, 
and in the process establish and maintain new norms of international beliefs and 
behavior.10 While not entirely new concepts, as briefly discussed in Chapter 1’s 
description on the events leading to the formation of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and 
Chapter 3’s analysis of Britain’s 19th century treaty port system, this thesis posits that 
                                                 
6
 Timo Koivurova, “The Arctic Council: A Testing Ground for New International Environmental 
Governance,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Fall-Winter 2012): 140-142, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1364726171?accountid=11752. 
7
 Marc Lanteigne, “‘Have You Entered the Storehouses of the Snow?’ China as a Norm Entrepreneur in the 
Arctic,” Polar Record 53, no. 2 (March 2017): 121, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247416000759. 
8
 Fa-ti Fan, “Victorian Naturalists in China: Science and Informal Empire,” British Journal for the History 
of Science 36, no. 128 (March, 2003): 25, https://doi:10.1017/S0007087402004910. 
9
 Trym Aleksander Eiterjord, “Arctic Technopolitics and China’s Reception of the Polar Code,” The Arctic 
Institute, May 26, 2020, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-technopolitics-china-reception-polar-
code/. 
10 Karen T. Litfin, “Framing Science: Precautionary Discourse and the Ozone Treaties,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 24, no. 2 (July 1995): 253, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298950240020501; Bertelsen, “The GCC-Russia-China LNG Triangle: The 





science or knowledge-based ‘territory’ may be supplanting traditional concepts of 
territorial-based legitimacy that have been foundational in international governance 
systems like the Arctic Council (AC). A wide array of other comparative studies in 
international political economy are relevant to globalization of the Arctic, as well as 
China’s specific means for achieving power. Historical analogies detailing the U.S.’s own 
use of science diplomacy in the Cold War, as undertaken by Bryan Lintott of 
Cambridge’s Scott Polar Research Institute,11 or studies related to the establishment of 
science and commercial hegemonies, similar to Chapter 3’s cameo on British treaty ports, 
Margaret Blunden’s article “Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route”,12 or Jason Smith’s 
dissertation work on 19th century U.S. Pacific expansion, are worthy of additional 
study.13  
Second, political anthropology plays a foundational, and at times strategic, role in 
the interaction between established and emerging Arctic states. Culture, history, and 
geographical symbolism serve as both context, and when skillfully exercised or joined 
with strategic imperatives, prove to be emotive methods for loosening otherwise 
insurmountable political obstacles between states. Finally, the Arctic demonstrates the 
human and physical processes by which a region rises in international prominence, and 
the consequences such promotion to a global theater holds for state, region, and world. In 
the last two decades, the forces of climate change, felt by the entire international 
community, have directly led to an Arctic pivot. In turn, previously external events now 
                                                 
11 Bryan Lintott, “The Coldest Front: The Central Intelligence Agency & American Antarctic Policy & 
Operations (1947-59),” lecture presented at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., February 25, 
2020. 
12 Margaret Blunden, “Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route,” International Affairs 88, no.1 (January 
2012), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01060.x. 
13 Jason W. Smith, To Master the Boundless Sea: the U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the 
Cartography of Empire (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 209. 
 
 5 
increasingly affect the Arctic, ranging from sub-regional conflicts or preparation for 
future war, social justice, transnational crime, food scarcity and other human security 
concerns, to pandemics. These now global experiences, contribute in innumerable ways 
to Arctic state and non-state interaction, and should be expected to continue to alter this 
newly internationalized space in the years to come. 
Beyond theorization, one might wonder why else contemporary Arctic geopolitics 
are worthy of study at this time. After all, the Arctic is just one region in which new 
conflicts, strategic partnerships, and environmental concerns are rapidly developing. 
While the three reasons for Arctic study listed below are primarily tailored to a U.S. 
policy audience, each could quite easily be adapted to serve the interests of any state or 
Arctic stakeholder. Such universal motivations also include global climate change 
concerns, new areas for commerce, security, and international influence. 
This thesis focuses on the political and human behavioral consequences of climate 
change in the Arctic, a small sample of its innumerable ramifications. This thesis is not 
designed to contribute significantly to the vast amount of existing work on climate 
science advocacy, and thus detailed discussion of climate change itself, while 
acknowledged as the principle catalyst driving Arctic geopolitical change, remains 
largely in a contextual background throughout. Climate change is arguably the most 
critical threat posed to global security in this century. Therefore, a short survey of the 
environmental forces driving Arctic geopolitics is necessary prior to beginning each 
chapter’s analysis. According to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s (NOAA) 2019 Arctic Report Card, sea ice thickness measured at the 
end of 2019’s summer season, tied 2016 and 2007 as the thinnest since analysis began in 
 
 6 
1979. In August 2019, several long studied sea areas recorded 1 to 7°C increases in mean 
water temperatures for that month.14 Final calculations for 2020 are incomplete as of this 
writing; however, preliminary analysis by the National Snow and Ice Data Center 
(NSIDC) found the 2020 summer season second only to 2012 in having the shortest 
annual extent of sea ice (Figures 1 and 2).15 The Greenland ice sheet, seen in dramatic 
videos of crumbling ice edifices, is now annually losing 267 billion metric tons of ice, 
resulting in global sea water rise of approximately 0.7mm a year.16 Glacial and sea ice 
melt has also exposed previously inaccessible mineral and fossil fuel resources, driving 
prospective interest and investment in the Arctic by an array of international companies. 
Traditionally ice-covered areas, like the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, that 
stood as grand obstacles to early explorers and served to establish international sea law 
and regional governance regimes, are becoming increasingly open to annual commercial 
shipping, resource exploitation, and tourist traffic.  
                                                 
14
 “Arctic Report Card: Update for 2019,” NOAA, accessed March 30, 2020, 
https://arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card/Report-Card-2019. 
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Figure 1. Preliminary analysis by NSIDC showing the annual extent of sea ice for 2020 as 
compared to the 1981-2010 median extent.17 
                                                 




Figure 2. NSIDC graphic depiction of sea ice extent showing 2020’s comparison to the record set during 
the 2012 summer season.18 
 
 
Some predictions, echoed by the U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy in its 2019 Arctic Strategy, hold that shipping areas of the Northwest Passage, 
Northern Sea Route, and Transpolar Route may become nearly or entirely ice-free by 
2040 (Figure 3).19 Should this occur, an analysis of shipping routes determined that 
                                                 
18 “Arctic Sea Ice News & Analysis,” National Snow and Ice Data Center, Accessed October 20, 2020, 
https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/. 
19
 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy,” 
U.S. Department of Defense, June 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-
DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF; Chief of Naval Operations, “The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap 
for 2014 to 2030,” U.S. Navy, February 2014, https://www.navy.mil/docs/USN_arctic_roadmap.pdf. Note: 




several standard city-pairs might benefit from either shorter, or “equidistant” commercial 
transit lanes.20 Opening of the first two routes will also increasingly stimulate ongoing 
international legal disputes over territorial water claims and freedom of navigation rights. 
Melting of the Transpolar Route might avoid some of these conflicts, but nonetheless 
initiate new environmental and commercial deliberations on the status and protection of 
the open Arctic Ocean. International anticipation of these nascent challenges is well 
underway, exemplified by evolving state policies, submission of seabed claims to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), and an outpouring of 
international law publishings on related matters.  
This great Arctic maritime opening is often coupled with a widely publicized 
2008 study by the U.S. Geological Survey, and follow up 2009 article in Science, that 
found offshore areas of the Arctic Circle may account for 30% of the world’s 
undiscovered natural gas (1,669 trillion cubic feet) and 13% of its undiscovered oil (90 
billion barrels).21 The implication of the opening of these vital resources and emerging 
commercial routes is clear, with history offering numerous examples of the spectrum of 
human activity and interaction that follows energy and mercantile interests. Extracting 
these resources also pose numerous challenges, some of which have yet to be overcome. 
However, commercial and sustainable development dialogues on new resource exploitive 
                                                 
acknowledging the preceding policy’s science-based analysis on ocean warming trends, opts not to offer a 
prediction on yearly ice coverage. 
20
 John L. Conway III, “Search and Rescue in the High North: an Air Force Mission?” Air & Space Power 
Journal 27, no. 6 (November 2013): 4, 21. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=91985859&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
21
 U.S. Geological Survey, “USGS Fact Sheet: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of 
Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-
3049.pdf; Ronald O’Rourke, et al., “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” 




innovations and technology are also occurring around the Arctic, and themselves serve as 
significant transnational forums. Thus, the effects of climate change, while strikingly 
present in the Arctic, are also felt by the international community as both a threat to their 
own shores, a potential arena for exploitation, and a stimulus for evolving governance 
solutions. Nansen’s possibilities for “conquering nature,” regrettably made easier by 
climate change, have become a global consideration. 
 
 
Figure 3. Depiction of Arctic Sea Routes, their total lengths between the Bering Strait and Rotterdam, 
Germany, and anticipated number of ice-free water by 2025.22 
                                                 
22 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Publication 183: Sailing Directions (Enroute) North 




Much has been written in international affairs and defense strategy circles about 
21st century great power dynamics. As stated above, the sub-Arctic actions of established 
and evolving international hegemons has a long history, but now routinely affect the 
Arctic. Great power competition in the region is included in the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy’s 2019 Arctic Strategy, cited as a developing threat to regional and 
world orders. It proclaims, “the Arctic is a potential avenue for expanded great power 
competition and aggression spanning between two key regions of ongoing competition 
identified in the NDS [National Defense Strategy]— the Indo-Pacific and Europe — and 
the U.S. homeland.”23 Scholarly debate on Arctic great power competition is a bit more 
nuanced as will be discussed in Chapter 1; however, it is safe to say there has been a 
dramatic increase in globally-relevant Arctic activities by China, Russia, NATO, and a 
host of non-Arctic littoral states in the last two decades. New strategic-level partnerships 
between Russia and China, the establishment of transnational commerce centered on 
Arctic energy resources, and re-vitalization and expansion of former Cold War military 
bases all contribute to a region deserving much greater scrutiny by U.S. and international 
policymakers.  
From a U.S. perspective, influence and operational capability imbalances in the 
far north should continue to pose a concern. Any developing region, including non-
territorial, conceptual, or scientific regions, provide avenues for states to establish or 
maintain ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. States like the U.S. that historically expect to influence 
global outcomes would be wise to recognize the modern Arctic exemplifies such a space. 
Since the early 2000s, China has heavily invested in the polar sciences, both as a 
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mitigating measure to predict climate change’s effects on its own coasts and to 
preemptively seize advantage in what it considers emerging strategic venues.24 This 
investment is now paying off, not simply in lucrative infrastructure, energy, mineral, 
shipping, and ship building partnerships across the Arctic, but most importantly in its 
growing international acceptance as an Arctic power. This thesis argues that international 
acceptance is the first step in China’s achievement of influence in the region’s 
governance systems. This is occurring just as U.S. international image and influence in 
the sciences, climate-change dialogue, economy, racial justice, and overall diplomatic 
engagement has measurably diminished, especially among close allies and other Western 
proponents of the established liberal order.25 Thus, while China remains this thesis’s 
object of study, it would behoove the U.S. policy-minded reader to keep in mind the four 
tenets of the U.S.’s traditional international position as outlined in the August 2020 
Congressional Research Service’s U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for 
Congress: “1) global leadership, 2) defense and promotion of the liberal international 
order, 3) defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights 4) prevention 
of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.”26 This is not to say China’s own 
dubious record on human rights, scientific veracity, and resource exploitive practices are 
to be disregarded. Each of these certainly play into residual mistrust on its overall Arctic 
intentions, and have served as the principle obstacles China has had to surmount in 
                                                 
24
 Julie Babin and Frederic Lasserre, “Asian States at the Arctic Council: Perceptions in Western States,” 
Polar Geography 42, no. 3 (February 2019): 145, https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2019.1578290. 
25
 Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, and Mara Mordecai, “U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say 




 Ronald O’Rourke and Michael Moodie, “R44891: U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for 
Congress,” Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2020, 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44891.pdf. 
 
 13 
gaining its current and desired levels of Arctic influence. However, if the U.S. intends to 
maintain a global leadership role, contemporary Arctic geopolitics offer one of the more 
promising theaters for exertion of its historic principles. Disregarding consistent 
engagement with China and established Arctic states over developing systems of regional 
governance will likely come with a price. This thesis argues that the real “race to the 
Arctic,” a more sensational moniker occasionally applied by the media, is in actuality a 
race to keep pace with the region’s dynamic governance systems and “transnational 
knowledge networks.”27 
 This thesis takes a qualitative, case study approach to answering how China is 
peripherally operating and constructing its role as an Arctic power. Organized into three 
chapters, these case studies cover contemporary interactions as well as two historical 
examples of non-territorial sovereignty based governance systems: the geopolitics 
surrounding the creation of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 19th century British treaty 
port system along China’s own coast. Chapter 1 provides a wide-angle perspective and 
background on contemporary Arctic geopolitics vis-à-vis China’s regional rise. It begins 
with a short primer on the AC and established regional governance. Then, China’s 2018 
Arctic Policy is thoroughly dissected, with an examination of the spectrum of existing 
analytical interpretations, including studies on Chinese organizational and greater 
strategic policy motivations. In the process, China’s concept of the Arctic’s global 
relevancy and governance —tied to science in its Arctic Policy— are explored along with 
its connection to the One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI). The chapter continues with a 
presentation of how China’s norm-engineering approach to overcoming regional 
                                                 
27 Bertelsen, “The International Political Systemic Context of Arctic Marine Resource Governance,” 4. 
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exclusion, through a variety of commercial and science based interactions with Arctic 
states, will impact established governance. The evolution of the AC’s ability to maintain 
and further epistemic structures resident within elements of its working groups is 
critiqued in order to compare regional influence systems.28 Chapter 1’s case study of the 
Antarctic Treaty, a science-based international governance regime, is examined again in 
the conclusion’s policy recommendations section.  
 Chapter 2 uses a political anthropological approach in its case study of 
Greenland’s evolving independence movement vis-à-vis nascent Chinese engagement 
and existing relationships between Greenland’s predominately Inuit population, their 
prior colonizer Denmark, and a strategically-minded U.S. In order to illustrate these 
dynamics, Greenland’s independence narratives are compared to the historical activities 
and modern policies of the U.S., Denmark, China, and to a lesser extent other IOs. These 
include Greenland’s perspectives on security and economic relationships, with the U.S. 
and Denmark providing the traditional nexus to NATO. Greenland’s interactions with the 
EU and the Western Nordic Council offer more recent interactions that may portend 
future multilateral alignments. Greenland also offers a study on China’s journey into 
Arctic geopolitics as it tenuously negotiates the U.S. and Denmark’s response to 
perceived strategic competition with its own motivations for commercial and global 
influence. The chapter considers these factors with the intention of predicting which 
entities might occupy an advantaged position in Greenland following its eventual 
independence. In the process, the reader gains further appreciation of the 
                                                 
28 Jennifer Spence, “Is a Melting Arctic Making the Arctic Council Too Cool? Exploring the Limits to the 
Effectiveness of a Boundary Organization,” Review of Policy Research 34, No. 6 (September 2017): 795, 
798, https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12257; Bertelsen, “The International Political Systemic Context of Arctic 
Marine Resource Governance,” 13. 
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internationalization of once regional issues regarding Greenland’s independence, U.S. 
policy, and continued study on the unintended effects of exclusionary state practices. 
 The final chapter describes the progressing relationship between China and Russia 
over Northern Sea Route development. It argues that it is here, at the top of the Eurasian 
continent, where China has most successfully achieved its desired Arctic end state, again 
aided by forces of exclusivity. It includes a brief study on the 19th century British system 
of ‘empire’ wherein global influence and power was not purely derived from territorial 
holdings, but rather highly integrated commercial and knowledge-based competencies. 
Chapter 3 returns to several elements discussed in the previous chapters including the 
creation and implementation of diverse knowledge-based forums: dedicated to both 
scientific and commercial pursuits, the multiple internal and external sources involved in 
influencing China’s Arctic designs, and larger concepts of global governance. Each case 
study is finally distilled into larger exclusion-peripheralization theory analysis and 



















In January 2018, China unveiled its long-awaited Arctic Policy paper, 
proclaiming itself a “Near Arctic State.”29 This new identity, coming five years after its 
admittance into the AC and in a decade that saw an international Arctic refocus, offers 
much strategic insight into China’s polar ambitions. This chapter examines China’s 
actions to support its Arctic statehood claim vis-à-vis the influence of the AC, the 
established international forum for Arctic regional policy development and advocacy. 
Following a primer on the AC and China’s 2018 Arctic Policy paper, we will examine 
how the AC’s viability might be altered in the future by China’s expressed goal to be 
legitimized as an international asset to polar “wisdom” and by the AC’s remaining 
structural exclusion of China.30 As an official AC Observer, China lacks voting power 
within the body. However, this influence limiter has not prevented China from 
establishing bilateral agreements with individual AC states; participating in, as well as 
leading, multi-state and multi-disciplinary polar epistemic communities; and advancing 
peripheral scientific research and natural resource exploitation activities. China’s 
spectrum of Arctic engagement alludes to complex internal motivations whereby its 
policy of “going out” is simultaneously driven by state owned enterprises (SOE), 
academic and scientific communities, provincial interests, and larger strategic goals 
including global governance schemes and advancement of the BRI.31 Each of these 
                                                 
29
 People’s Republic of China State Council Information Office, “China’s Arctic Policy.” 
30
 People’s Republic of China State Council Information Office, “China’s Arctic Policy.” 
31 Martin Kossa, “China’s Arctic Engagement: Domestic Actors and Foreign Policy,” Global Change, 
Peace & Security 32, no. 1 (July 2019): 20-21, DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2019.1648406.  
 
 17 
elements cycle through its inner policy making organs, as will soon be discussed in 
analysis of the 2018 Arctic Policy.  
China’s norm-creation in the Arctic follows constructivist international relations 
(IR) theory models exhibited by emerging powers. Its exclusion from the AC also reflects 
issues faced in establishing and maintaining the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, a science-based 
governance regime that offers an alternative to traditional territorial sovereignty-based 
hierarchical constructs of most IOs. Though the Antarctic Treaty’s physical and 
geopolitical environment differs from that of the Arctic, it represents one possible 
solution for stronger international governance, particularly over unclaimed or disputed 
resource areas of the Arctic Ocean. In the process of this analysis, this paper also 
investigates how norm creation supported by knowledge accumulation, rather than 
traditional territorial capital, may portend a growing evolution in what constitutes 
legitimacy within IOs. 
Environmental Change Meets Geopolitics: A Primer on the Arctic Council 
and China’s Developing Role as a “Near Arctic State” 
 
The AC was founded in 1996 as a “high level forum” for “promoting cooperation, 
coordination and interaction among the Arctic States...Arctic indigenous communities, 
and other Arctic inhabitants on...issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic.”32 In its current structure, the AC is comprised of eight Member 
States recognized by their possession of sovereign territories above or bordering the 
Arctic Circle. These states include the U.S., Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, 
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Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Russia. Each state enjoys a rotational Chairmanship 
lasting two years. Members also provide Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) which oversee 
each of the AC’s working groups, the forum’s main policy development organs and 
principle epistemic arenas.33 The AC’s Permanent Participants are comprised of 
indigenous groups from across the Arctic led by the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat. 
Permanent Participant representatives interact throughout each of the AC’s strata, giving 
them a unique ability to influence decisions throughout the organization.34 Beginning in 
1998, “extra-territorial”35 Observer states and non-government organizations were 
permitted to participate, but not vote or chair, the AC’s six working groups. The latter 
remain principally focused on environmental issues and sustainability, with five of the six 
exclusively devoted to related disciplines. While retaining the organization’s central 
environmentalist and cooperative tenets, the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response (EPPR) working group has an additional focus on safety measures including 
search and rescue (SAR) policy. 
Politically recognized territory, or in the case of indigenous groups, traditional 
homelands, remain the organization’s principle discriminator for its established 
hierarchy. The controversial 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, by the self-proclaimed Arctic-5,36 
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sought to reinforce this territorial-based stratum and underline the preeminence of 
international law after the infamous 2007 Russian flag planting on the seafloor of the 
North Pole. However, the Declaration is also credited with unintentionally creating 
geopolitical pressure to include additional Observer states and NGOs in AC deliberations, 
exemplifying the exclusion-peripheralization causality.37 In 2013, the AC gave Observer 
status to China, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, India, and Italy, signaling an opening for 
states with few historical ties, and significantly, non-Western interests in the Arctic.38 As 
will be discussed shortly, while Observer status has been welcomed by these new states, 
the exclusionary structure of the AC as well as its environmental focus remains, leading 
to the development of peripheral forums and knowledge networks with more diverse 
followings.  
Of the AC’s new Observers, China has been the most active in establishing its 
presence in the AC’s working groups, furthering its agenda to become a recognized 
global leader in Arctic affairs.39 China’s 2018 Arctic Policy as well as associated official 
and scholarly rhetoric follow most global reactions to the climate crisis and associated 
geopolitical dynamics, namely that sea level rise and other associated environmental 
impacts will be equally felt by all states, and thus all states have rights and obligations to 
attempt to mitigate its effects. For the Arctic, this global governance assertion both 
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substantiates and challenges what has traditionally been a regional, territorial-based 
governance and advocacy regime represented by the AC.  
While much in China’s Arctic Policy can be left to interpretation, several strategic 
themes are readily apparent. First, while noting a lack of comprehensive governance for 
the region, China acknowledges the preeminence of existing international laws and 
protections afforded Arctic territories, specifically the UN, UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), 1925 Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty, and individual Arctic states’ 
sovereignty rights. However, in the open Arctic Ocean, encompassing ‘the Area’ in 
standard UNCLOS terminology, China is quick to list legal open ocean activities 
including scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, submarine cable and pipeline 
laying, exploration and exploitation.40 Scientific research, mentioned 57 times in the 
paper, is noted as a primary means of cooperating with the international community. 
Scientific exploration has long been an avenue for exerting strategic and commercial 
influence in uncharted territories, a relationship Jason Smith frames in his description of 
the U.S.’s own 19th century Pacific hydrographic expeditions as “the empirical was 
inextricably imperial.”41 As will be discussed later, while China is not seeking imperial 
claims to Arctic territory and appears to be embracing a system of egalitarian 
multinational scientific interaction in the region, it is still exploring ways to leverage 
scientific and geopolitical relationships to gain strategic advantage in a region where it 
has not traditionally held influence.  
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Second, China attempts to establish historical geo-relevancy, designed after the 
Western model, tracing Chinese Arctic equities back to the 1925 Spitsbergen Treaty. The 
paper expounds on China’s long commitment to Arctic science and exploration, noting its 
14 years of research at the Yellow River Station in Ny Alesund, Spitsbergen Archipelago, 
Norway and eight scientific explorations to the Arctic Ocean as of 2017. As will be 
further discussed, these scientific enterprises represent the complexities of Chinese polar 
motivations, serving as vital links to respected international knowledge networks, 
conduits to Chinese Arctic policy development, and means for advancement of larger 
global initiatives like the BRI. 
Finally, China bridges its commitment as a “responsible major country” and 
active participant in global scientific advocacy to Arctic cooperative engagement with an 
introduction of the “Polar Silk Road” component of China’s greater BRI initiative. In so 
doing, it underlines China’s concept of global governance over the Arctic space. The 
white paper concludes, “China…is ready to cooperate with all relevant parties to seize the 
historic opportunity in the development of the Arctic, to address the challenges brought 
by the changes in the region, jointly understand, protect, develop and participate in the 
governance of the Arctic, and advance Arctic-related cooperation under the Belt and 
Road Initiative, so as to build a community with a shared future for mankind and 
contribute to peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic.”42 Some scholars 
and journalists regard this final pronouncement with suspicion, claiming the north’s 
opening for resource exploitation as the beginning of a 21st century “Great Game.”43 
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Others see more global governance intentions, related to a changing physical and 
geopolitical environment. 
Scholarly interpretations of China’s Arctic ambitions both preceding and 
following its Arctic Policy paper can be best categorized via established IR theories. 
Most of these writings anchor on the AC’s continuing influence amidst both changing 
physical and geopolitical environments. Realists caution of increased Chinese influence 
on the AC and its peripheries, arguing the current AC structure may not go far enough in 
protecting the Arctic from exploitation from a proven revisionist power. Citing 
Mearsheimer, some Realists go as far as to encourage preventing Chinese or other extra-
territorial states from achieving any purchase in the region. Liberals meanwhile welcome 
China to cooperative Arctic institutions and warn that excluding any state or non-state 
interests will ultimately lead to the AC’s fragmentation and less monitored peripheral 
activities. With the recent exceptions of U.S. and Danish actions towards Chinese 
development projects discussed in Chapter 2 and aforementioned AC exclusions, Liberal 
policies appear to dominate most state and non-state policies toward China’s entrance 
into the region’s various diplomatic forums.44 China’s desire to be recognized as a “Near 
Arctic” state and a “responsible major country” also meets the social norm-building 
criteria of Constructivists, who view China’s activities in terms of established social 
entrepreneurship models. How precisely China is pursuing Arctic norm creation and its 
potential effect on the AC’s influence remains understudied. However, its significant 
investment in polar science, related strategic communications, and alliance building on 
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the AC’s borders evokes historic global power strategies when approaching uncharted 
geopolitical regions. 
Perhaps the most enlightening perspective related to China’s 2018 Arctic policy 
comes from those studying the inner workings of the Chinese organizations tasked with 
producing the paper itself. Martin Kossa documents the multiple interest groups 
assembled for the task in describing China’s overall organizational model as both an 
example of “fragmented authoritarianism,” and a “consultive authoritarian regime,” 
where official decisions are mandated by the Chinese Communist Party, but the policy 
itself is derived below the Politburo level by a diverse cast of “sub-state actors.”45 Kossa 
describes each step in the 2018 policy’s creation and influence process. The first step 
took place in 2011 when the State Council initiated an Arctic committee composed of 20 
government ministries, led by the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). At its 
beginning, this was purely a government led process; however, consultation with SOEs, 
provincial government representatives, and technical experts took place after the 
committee disseminated its draft to this sub-strata.46 These sub-consultants included 
representatives of the northeast provinces of Jilin and Liaoning, which stand the most to 
gain from opening of Arctic commerce; state-owned oil, gas, and shipping companies; a 
growing cast of Arctic research institutes; and to a lesser extent the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLA(N). Each of these entities gained exposure to the Arctic through 
numerous international engagement avenues, which diffuse global perspectives, or 
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“transnational knowledge” into what is otherwise an internal policymaking structure.47 
Thus, China’s Arctic white paper, connected to its larger “going out” policy encapsulated 
in the BRI, is motivated by a vast host of actors, many of which gain their perspectives 
from outside any more insulated state entity.  
China as an Arctic “Norm Entrepreneur”: A Challenge to Established 
International Governance Regimes? 
The AC’s organizational structure and influence hierarchy is no different than 
most traditional IOs presiding over a specific regional space. Parties stake their authority 
within the IO on sovereign territorial holdings, historic precedences, established 
international hierarchy norms, or all three. “Norm entrepreneurship,” or the process of 
building upon or introducing new global ideologies, requires concerted “actioning” by 
states or non-states.48 This effort is approached both administratively and through 
strategic communications branding. The former is often pursued by acquiring leadership 
positions within specific IO working groups that most closely align to the party’s end 
state.49 In China’s case within the AC, its polar activities following admittance seem to 
demonstrate the expected behavior of any developed state previously isolated from a 
region of influence, with appointment of new ambassadors, increased participation in 
working groups, establishment of bilateral agreements with regional states, growth of 
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research publications, and general public outreach.50 However, in terms of international 
hierarchy, some scholars still describe China as a “frustrated great power,” well 
positioned in all the required global institutions, including those focused on the poles and 
outer space, yet lacking the respect afforded more established powers.51 As a result of this 
disparity, China appears to be pursuing Arctic recognition from both administrative and 
science-forward angles to gain this coveted level of elite legitimacy.52 Its emphasis on 
calling itself a “responsible major country” in its Arctic Policy’s concluding paragraph 
appears to be a not-so-subtle attempt to reconcile frustration caused by its exclusion. 
Since 2014, China has remained most active in the AC’s Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), and 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working groups.53 While China’s 
underlying motivations for Arctic involvement may be exploitive and strategic in nature, 
its activities within the AC’s working groups appear to non-aggressive and in keeping 
with the AC’s charter. The volume of published Chinese academic Arctic research nearly 
doubled between 2005 and 2015, with some noticeable change in primary subject 
material from the natural sciences to more exploitive topics like shipping and resource 
extraction since 2008.54 Despite this moderate internal academic evolution, Chinese 
representatives sent to staff working groups typically have oceanography or 
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meteorological backgrounds, rather than commercial experience.55 These envoys are 
sourced via the MFA, which in conjunction with its Ministry of Natural Resources 
(MNR) and Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration represent the principle intra-
state policy interlocutors with the AC and other regional forums.56 As a result of this 
government connection, statements made by Chinese Arctic envoys, primarily in 
peripheral forums like the Arctic Circle Assembly, often represent the most current state 
policy.57 Currently, China budgets an estimated $75 million to polar research and 
expeditions with an increasing number of state research and academic institutions 
devoted to polar studies.58 China’s research interests and AC participation thus far appear 
to be primarily designed to instill a new international perception that it has pragmatic 
answers to many of the far north’s key environmental and resource challenges.59 
However, might China’s intentions also allude to a greater shift in norm-creation 
within 21st century international institutions? While Lanteigne posits that norm creation 
in traditional territorial-based regimes can be quite difficult, other scholars like Mia 
Bennet, argue future influence in the region will be less about territorial holdings and 
more about which state or entities influence the creation of lasting regulations on 
environmental, human security, and resource exploitation.60 Both Oran Young and Timo 
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Koivurova recognize this greater international movement and resultant requirement for 
future AC restructuring, with the latter arguing “flexible regional” systems with close ties 
to science like the AC may serve as the best model for modern international governance 
systems.61 As will be described in the following section, successful flexibility likely 
depends on greater inclusion of non-governmental entities within the AC’s ranks. 
Branding is yet another aspect of Chinese norm entrepreneurship. While perhaps a 
less sophisticated feature of its approach, China’s self-proclaimed “Near Arctic” 
statehood nonetheless poses a significant provocation to established, largely Western, 
concepts of Arctic claim, paving a potential ideological path towards international 
acceptance of China as a regional power player. Notably, the brand itself is credited to 
Zhang Xia, Division of Polar Strategic Studies at the Polar Research Institute of China, 
again demonstrating the internal influence of polar research institutions as one of the 
main sources of direction for Chinese Arctic policy.62 Western, non-Arctic states have 
manufactured similar tag lines while inciting far less concern, including the U.K.’s 
“Arctic’s Nearest Neighbor” moniker used in its own 2013 Arctic White Paper.63 As in 
its working group and research presence, the Chinese have also used derivatives of the 
“Near Arctic” statehood brand to align with established Arctic philosophies including 
protection of indigenous peoples. This included a celebration of its “Near Arctic Peoples” 
at the 2019 Shanghai-based Arctic Circle forum, which was met with suspicion over its 
seemingly heavy-handed use of cultural stewardship mores to influence the international 
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community and particularly AC states.64 For the time being, perhaps China’s 
proclamations will largely reside within internal research and government circles, which 
routinely use the phrases “Near-Arctic State” and “legitimate stakeholder in the Arctic” 
when defining or defending China’s status.65 However, the international community is 
warming to the concept of peripheral Chinese expertise and dialogue, and certainly its 
Arctic commercial promise. 
Arctic Peripheral Organizations, Stimulating the Arctic Council’s 
Fragmentation or Evolution? 
 
A special 2013 issue of Global Environmental Politics, edited by Fariborz Zelli 
and Harro van Asselt, comments on the inherent fragmentation exhibited by 
environmentally focused IOs. Contributing authors Thijs Van de Graaf, Sylvia I. 
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Jeffrey McGee use the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as an example, arguing the work of such IOs 
is typically distributed down to smaller NGOs, owing to domestic pressures and the 
“transactional costs” incurred by parties in creating and maintaining the larger bodies. 
However, the authors conclude that despite individual issue level fragmentation, the 
parent organization typically retains overall international legitimacy.66 One enduring 
example within the AC’s own influence region is the International Arctic Science 
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Committee (IASC), which joins scientists from both Arctic and non-Arctic states’ leading 
national scientific organizations. IASC, to which China is also a party, has enjoyed AC 
Observer status since 1998 and regularly contributes to its working groups.67 In this 
section, we will further examine sources of fragmentation along the AC’s borders, 
supported by Chinese influence. Evaluating the health of the AC in the years following 
China’s entrance will be done in two ways: analyzing the growth of peripheral 
organizations and projects to which China is either party or associate and determining 
how the AC itself is evolving to incorporate further international expertise into its own 
structure. 
Study on the growth of alternative forums to the AC began in earnest following 
the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, a product of the exclusionary Arctic-5 diplomatic 
construct. Scholars caution such exclusion naturally leads to the development of outside 
structures and bilateral opportunities, facilitating individual states and non-state entities’ 
ability to take part in Arctic development while lessening the AC’s own influence.68 
These extra-AC groups are primarily focused on commercial versus environmental 
issues, potentially representing a shift in overall global priority from a narrative of 
environmental and cultural stewardship, to one primarily of exploitation with more 
superficial environmental premises. Several immediate responses to the 2008 Ilulissat 
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Declaration were Iceland’s increased bilateral cooperation with Chinese shipping 
companies and 2013 establishment of the Arctic Circle Forum, Sweden’s “Common 
Concern for the Arctic” conference held in Ilulissat four months after the Declaration, 
and Finland’s advocation for including the European Union (EU) as an AC Observer.69  
As of this writing, the EU remains excluded from official Observer membership, despite 
repeated application, but can send envoys to view AC proceedings.70 
Bilateral agreements and other natural resource-focused projects between China 
and individual AC states, although existing prior, increased following the 2008 Ilulissat 
Declaration (Table 1). China advanced land and energy deals with Finland, Denmark, 
Norway, and Russia including the joint Power of Siberia pipelines and Yamal LNG.71 
The Yamal LNG and Northern Sea Route development in particular will be covered in 
more detail in Chapter 3. Iceland, already enjoying a closer relationship with China than 
most AC states following its 2005 initiation of Europe’s first free trade agreement, 2013 
construction of a large Chinese Embassy in Reykjavík, and expressed interest in a $200 
million tourist facility in Grímsstaðir by Beijing Zhongkun Investment Group, 
established the “China-Iceland Joint Aurora Observatory” in 2018.72 Of all Arctic states, 
Iceland serves as the principle co-development model with China. Since 2016, Greenland 
has become a major focus for Chinese investment and bilateral exchange, stressing 
domestic relationships with Denmark. In addition to several mining activities, China has 
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also courted Greenland with proposals for an Arctic research station, satellite ground 
station, and infrastructure renovation projects.73 A 2018 study published in the Arctic 
Yearbook that examined both Chinese policy and academic materials concluded China’s 
interest in Greenland can best be expressed by the two types of mining projects currently 
in its focus: zinc and rare earth elements (REE). As China’s own domestic zinc mining 
reserves are among the world’s largest, its Citronen Fjord zinc project is most likely 
designed to gain strategic access rather than the actual resource. Its Kvanefjeld REE 
project meanwhile, is primarily intended to obtain the resource itself, one it considers 
“strategic” in its own right.74 China’s interest in Greenland will be covered in much 
greater detail in Chapter 2. 
The Russian government-sponsored “Territory of Dialogue, International Arctic 
Forum,” established in 2010 and occurring on a biannual basis since 2017, represents one 
of the more aggressive policy and development-focused collaborations with China 
outside the AC. According to its Russian government website, the Territory of Dialogue 
offers an opportunity for “socioeconomic development of Arctic regions and for 
developing multi-level, multilateral mechanisms for joint discovery and effective 
exploitation of the Arctic’s rich natural resource potential.”75 It specifically promotes 
itself as a forum for non-Arctic states like China, India, South Korea, Singapore and 
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others to have a voice in the region’s economic, scientific, and “environmental 
management” opportunities outside of what it considers an Arctic policy arena already 
“well represented” by Western states.76 During its 5th meeting, held in St. Petersburg in 
April 2019, Russia and China signed an agreement establishing the joint Chinese-Russian 
Arctic Research Center. The center’s activities will be overseen by scientists from the 
Institute of Oceanology at the Russian Academy of Sciences and Qingdao National 
Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology.77  
 The China-Nordic Arctic Research Center (CNARC) is one of China’s most 
robust science-diplomatic frameworks for forging partnerships with Nordic states. 
Established in Shanghai in 2013 in conjunction with China’s Polar Research Institute 
(PRIC), CNARC is widely considered a successful epistemic community, or even a track-
two diplomatic forum between 20 academic and research organizations from China, 
Denmark-Greenland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland. Russian, U.S., and South 
Korean representatives have also participated as CNARC observers.78 Unlike the AC, 
CNARC has not limited its purview to environmental sustainability. Although science 
nominally remains at its foundation, CNARC’s “Economic Roundtable”  also involves 
business, media, NGOs, and political interests, including Chinese shipping, infrastructure 
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developers, and legal and political scholarship in parallel with CNARC’s other 
initiatives.79 Past conferences have included topics such as China and Iceland’s joint 
infrastructure projects and Arctic tourism. According to Yang Jian of the Shanghai 
Institutes for International Studies, CNARC has led to knowledge diffusion of multiple 
hard and social science disciplines from Nordic countries to China and greater Asia while 
lessening suspicion of Chinese Arctic intentions. Given Chinese academia’s role in 
producing and directing Chinese policy, CNARC is credited in playing a prominent role 
in the evolution of China and Nordic states’ greater Arctic policies, including an 
increasing focus on global governance related to climate change.80 This has in turn also 
increased scientific collaboration between China and other rising Arctic states such as 
Japan and South Korea.81 Finally, many of the same Chinese and Nordic scientists are 
credited in setting up two China-U.S. Arctic Social Science Forums with the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) between 2015-2016, combining researchers 
from the Nordics, China, and a prominent U.S. think tank.82 
 In addition to the decade’s growth of Arctic scientific and multi-disciplinary 
forums, the establishment of joint research stations throughout the Arctic region appears 
to have increased since 2016. With the exception of its Svalbard Yellow River station, 
each of these projects occurred following or in conjunction with bilateral energy or 
mining agreements as seen in Table 1’s timeline. The synthesis of resource exploitation 
and scientific research has not gone unnoticed. A 2019 U.S. Department of Defense 
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report to Congress entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China,” directly links Arctic scientific exploration with incipient Chinese 
commercialization and even possible future militarization. The report also mentions 
Denmark’s concern over Chinese meddling in domestic policies over Greenland’s 
future.83 The Arctic Institute, a non-profit Arctic research organization based in 
Washington D.C., has compiled studies on other Arctic nations’ private reactions to 
Chinese activities. The institute notes that while scientific and private business interests 
have warmed to Chinese regional involvement, state defense and intelligence agencies, 
including Sweden’s Defense Agency, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, and 
Norwegian Foreign Intelligence Services remain wary of Chinese motivations behind 
what are officially described as scientific endeavors.84  
 It is likely that while China’s official Arctic voyages, conducted by its 
government research vessels, as well information gleaned via SOE transits through 
opening Arctic straits have served dual use purposes, jointly operated research centers 
will retain a purely scientific purview. Of note, China’s Arctic research expeditions have 
included representatives from a host of Arctic and non-Arctic states including Japan and 
South Korea until 2009 and the U.S. through 2016.85 The geopolitics surrounding these 
cut off years are worthy of additional study and very likely relate to strategic friction in 
unrelated spheres. It is highly unlikely that physical centers with projects shared with 
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Nordic scientists would be used for surreptitious purposes. However, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 3, warming commercial and strategic relations with Russia may involve more 
than simply scientific partnerships. At the moment, scientific forums and joint scientific 
infrastructure construction most likely represent one of China’s multiple avenues for 
cooperative Arctic discourse, setting up advantageous commercial prospects, and larger 
regional influence. This also features cooperative scientific ventures with representatives 
from other extra-territorial states, including with Japan and South Korea with which 
China has dynamic and adversarial relationships in other global theaters. Notable 
exchanges between these states include an April 2016 Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on 
the Arctic hosted in Seoul, South Korea between the Arctic ambassadors of the three 
Asian powers regarding scientific research ventures related to climate change and 
sustainable development.86 Projects such as the Nippon Foundation of Japan and  General 
Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans’ (GEBCO) Seabed 2030 Project, a collaborative sea 
floor mapping mission led by scientists from 15 nations including China, Russia, South 
Korea, Japan, the U.S., and Nordic states, demonstrate one form of operationalized Arctic 
knowledge networks contributing to a globally-recognized gain.87 The Multidisciplinary 
Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAiC) project, comprised of 80 
research institutions from 20 states including China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the 
U.S. is another.88 Significantly, China appears willing to embrace collaborative science in 
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the Arctic with rival powers and has not shown significant signs of dominating or 
excluding them from such forms of cooperation. 
Table 1. Timeline of Developing Bilateral Agreements, Alternative Forums, or 
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 As in all aspects of Chinese emergence as an Arctic power, there is a wide 
divergence of scholarship on the subject of the AC’s continuing viability amidst 
challenges from outside developments. Timo Koivurova discounts fears of a usurpation 
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of the Arctic regime, pointing to the continuing existence and Chinese respect of 
UNCLOS, the IMO, and multinational agreements like the UNFCCC. He argues the 
AC’s successful involvement in brokering agreements like the 2011 Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue exemplifies a durable organizational model.89 While the 
2011 SAR agreement predated China’s AC entrance, more recent AC-and Chinese 
supported statutes like the IMO’s binding 2017 Polar Code and 2018 Agreement to 
Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean continue to support 
Koivurova’s assertion. In collaboration with Piotr Graczyk, Koivurova also notes the 
AC’s foundational documents that put limits on the power of Observers to unduly 
influence the AC’s decisions through excessive financing or adding institutional 
burdens.90 
The AC appears to be somewhat heeding the advice of scholars like Stokke and 
Landriault et al., who as of 2019 still cautioned that the current AC regime, dominated by 
states, is not complete without suitable forums in which other voices like NGOs, 
businesses, and scientific interests perceive avenues of influence.91 Although the AC 
continues to exclude corporate interests and maintains its focus on sustainability and 
environment stewardship, as of 2017, it has invited multiple new partners and NGOs to 
participate as Observers (Table 2). Of these, the IMO offers the most favorable avenue 
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for courting international shipping interests —of particular importance to China —albeit 
within already internationally recognized and binding frameworks like the Polar Code. 
 




International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) 
2017 Network of scientific groups focused on sustainability of the oceans 
OSPAR Commission 2017 EU + 15 governments focused on northeast Atlantic marine conservancy 
World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) 
2017 International meteorological data exchange 
West Nordic Council 
(WNC) 
2017 Greenland, Iceland, Faroe Islands parliamentary forum 
Oceana 2017 International ocean advocacy NGO 
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
2019 Shipping safety and the prevention of marine and atmospheric pollution 
 
 
Despite permitting entry of these new participants, the AC is likely to continue to 
face criticism over its structural inability to better contain forces detrimental to its 
environmentally focused charter. Though this criticism is unlikely to erode international 
recognition of the AC’s advocacy role, as mining, shipping, and dual-purpose research 
interests continue to develop in the region in parallel with climate change and spurred on 
by Chinese investment, the AC may need to reproach its “architecture of governance.”92 
Some scholars like Oran Young have suggested initiating a more binding 
intergovernmental treaty system, that both maintains the AC’s science-based foundation 
while better including new global actors.93 The challenge of establishing a larger, more 
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globalized system include lack of support by Arctic territorial states, and increasing what 
critics have already observed as a degradation of decisiveness and communication 
between the ACs’s organizational strata. Jennifer Spence’s study of the AC as a 
“boundary organization,” or one that inherently brings together disparate groups, found 
that international pressure to evolve the AC from a simple post Cold War Arctic 
advocacy forum into a modern strategic-level IO has come with notable efficiency costs. 
This is particularly evident in the wariness displayed by Member state government 
representatives to take strong positions on Arctic issues that may have greater strategic 
consequences for their respective governments.94 Nonetheless, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty 
system along with its subsequent environmental annexes offers an existing diplomatic 
example, and a historical parable against exclusivity. 
Case Study: The 1959 Antarctic Treaty. A Triumph of Scientific Cooperation 
over Imperialism in Adverse Environments, and an Arctic Model? 
In several studies examining the effects of adverse physical environments on 
international cooperative institutions, scholars point to the natural tendency of states to 
work together even if in competition elsewhere. For example, in Michael Byers’s article 
“Cold, Dark, and Dangerous: International Cooperation in the Arctic and Space,” he 
explores the reasons why Russia and the U.S., along with the AC’s other NATO states, 
maintained relatively positive interactions in their polar and outer space relationships, 
despite conflict over the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Byers argues that these adverse and 
austere environments uniquely condition and demand cooperation among associated 
states, allowing them to withstand strong competing pressures to engage in conflict.95 
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Along a similar line of thought, Ingrid Lundestad and Øystein Tunsjø cite the Arctic’s 
challenging environment, lack of corresponding support infrastructure, and existing 
diplomatic institutionalism as reasons why there has been a lack of escalation in the 
rivalry between China and the U.S. The authors also state that these unique physical and 
geopolitical factors represent positive means for future cooperation even if environmental 
changes continue to increase the Arctic’s strategic and commercial value.96 The examples 
above on China’s embrace of cooperative Arctic science offer continuing support to these 
theories. Lessons from the Antarctic Treaty also support this argument, demonstrating 
that a cooperative method of scientifically understanding, rather than conquering nature, 
may be an answer to increased inclusion in the Arctic region as well.  
Notably, the Antarctic’s human, geopolitical, and physical environments differ in 
multiple respects to the Arctic. The South Pole has never been home to traditional tribal 
lands and does not feature significant expanses of sovereign territories. Small islands 
falling within the Economic Exclusion Zones of bordering states are the only exceptions. 
Physically, the bulk of Antarctica is defined by an ice-covered, singular continental land 
mass, compared to the Arctic’s mixture of seven continental shelves, seasonally ice-
covered archipelagic waters and the central Arctic Ocean. Given its geographical location 
and composition, Antarctica was never sought out as a potential bridge between major 
desirable commercial regions. However, while Antarctica has a shorter human history 
than the Arctic, it too has been subject to strategic exploration, commercialization, and 
related attempts at resource claim since the 18th century. As this study will examine, the 
development and maintenance of the Antarctic Treaty system, in concert with the South 
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Pole’s adverse environmental conditions, ultimately led to the successful implementation 
of a science-based cooperative regime there. This governance model mirrors the AC’s 
science-forward and cooperative foundation, and also offers lessons against territorial-
based organizational hierarchies.  
Twentieth century state interactions over the Antarctic prior to the implementation 
of the Antarctic Treaty were fraught with increasing resource competition. In 1908, the 
British became the first to lay claim to Antarctic territory, followed soon after by 
Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, France, and Norway. As Steven Blumenfeld 
chronicles, competing claims by Antarctic newcomers like the U.S. and Soviet Union 
were dismissed by the early 20th century’s set of great powers, and nearly all Antarctic 
claimants quickly found themselves quarreling over overlapping territories.97 World War 
II and its immediate aftermath accelerated the potential for conflict, with Argentina and 
Chile attempting to advance a joint claim over the entire continent in 1941. A war-weary 
Britain nonetheless still found it essential to dispute its rivals’ proclamation, issuing the 
1946 Bingham Declaration declaring British commercial and exploratory activities in the 
region would continue. A string of increasingly aggressive interactions ensued, leading to 
the first peace accord over the Antarctic in 1949 in which Britain, Argentina, and Chile 
agreed to a moratorium on warships below 60° South latitude.98  
In 1947, the U.S., now a global power, ushered in the Cold War by re-attempting 
its own claim on the Antarctic via Operation High Jump. Although publicly promoted as 
                                                 
97 Steven Blumenfeld, “For Science and Peace: The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty 
System,” Yale Economic Review 6, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2010): 29, https://search-proquest-
com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/central/docview/236619837/fulltextPDF/733FA5805ED948C4PQ/1?accountid
=11752. 




a large-scale winter training exercise, the 4,700 soldiers and 13 naval vessels that took 
part represented the U.S.’s subversive intention to establish an undisputed Antarctic 
presence and muscle the Soviet Union out of the region.99 Diplomatic meetings brokered 
by the U.S. and other governments took place over the next five years, with the U.S. 
continually attempting to decrease Soviet influence in the region. Finally, in 1952, an 
idea for launching the International Geophysical Year (IGY), a derivative of the First and 
Second Polar Year concepts, gained traction, first in scientific circles and evolving to 
include government policy makers. The premise behind the Polar and Geophysical Years 
placed international scientific cooperation over geopolitical competition.100 Between 
1957 and 1959, twelve states including the U.S. and Soviet Union, sent scientific teams to 
the Antarctic to run joint experiments together.101 Notably, a 1959 CIA report 
recommended the U.S. use existing scientific institutions like the National Science 
Foundation versus defense capabilities to influence the Antarctic’s geopolitical 
environment.102 Riding a wave of IGY optimism, the U.S. initiated what became the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty, one based on scientific cooperation that prevented future unilateral 
claims to the continent. 
The Antarctic Treaty has added additional provisions aimed at protecting the 
vulnerable polar environment and ecosystem since coming into force in 1961. One of its 
most diplomatically challenging updates was the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of 
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Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, which later evolved into the 1991 Madrid 
Protocol. States have long sought the Antarctic’s mineral resources, an underlying reason 
for many of the 20th century’s scientific expeditions. Again, the Antarctic Treaty system 
succeeded, establishing a 50-year ban on mineral exploitation.103 Lessons from the 
Madrid Protocol deserves greater comparative study with the Arctic’s more sovereignty-
laden territorial environment, the AC’s current organizational structure, and increasing 
global pursuit of the region’s natural resources due to climate change. 
While the Antarctic human and physical environment differs from the Arctic, 
potential lessons are apparent in its enduring structure. For one, the diffusion of scientific 
exchanges into government policies draws parallels to the Arctic’s modern epistemic 
communities and their own influence on Chinese and other state Arctic strategies. 
Science-diplomacy is also apparent in various manifestations in the modern Arctic, 
joining together scientists from states including the U.S., China, and Russia in peaceful 
cooperative projects, despite conflicts elsewhere. However, more time is necessary to 
prove whether these collaborative enterprises may spur on larger strategic-level change in 
national policies. The Antarctic Treaty also provides an easy comparison to the 
consequences of exclusionary behavior. At the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. was 
pushed to the periphery, and once achieving its own great power status, attempted to do 
the same to other states. Reflecting modern critiques over the AC’s voting and power 
dynamics, in 1983, the Malaysian government issued an official complaint to the UN, 
stating the Antarctic Treaty was designed, structured, and maintained solely by global 
                                                 




powers leaving developing states out as more dominate states decided global policy over 
the region.104 Malaysia’s criticism eventually led to a system of increased inclusion. 
Today, 54 states are member to the Antarctic Treaty, divided not along territorial 
lines, but rather based on their current level of scientific contribution into “Consultative” 
and “Non-Consultative” parties.105 Certainly, this composition still presents potential 
avenues for strategic maneuver given that “polar identity” is considered among the 
necessary trappings of international prestige,106 but the construct reduces the ability of 
states to act outside of purely scientific pursuits. In the coming decades, as polar ice-melt 
continues, imposing a similar governance over unclaimed areas of the Arctic Ocean, or 
even the entire Arctic region, may be the best means for furthering global cooperation 
while protecting vulnerable resources. Such a system would recognize China’s outward 
pursuit of polar research and strategic desire for international legitimacy, while 
minimizing or at least exposing, more subversive attempts at resource access. However, 
such a system would require high levels of international leadership, multiple stakeholder 
concurrence, and if comprising currently claimed or disputed areas such as extended 
continental shelves, likely undesirable forfeitures of Arctic resources. The AC’s current 
construction as a “low politics”107 arena governed by select states, while ideal for its 
regional advocacy role, may not be well suited to singularly advance such a 
comprehensive concept.   
Conclusion 
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China’s 2018 proclamation of “Near-Arctic” statehood heralds a changing 
dynamic in the Arctic geopolitical landscape. The forces of climate change are 
globalizing what once was an AC regime characterized by regional advocacy, structured 
along likewise regional territorial interests. China, to a lesser extent other AC Observers, 
and external scientific and commercial forums, are the primary challengers to this 
institutional exclusivity. China routinely courts individual AC states through commercial 
and scientific bilateral projects, advancing new international recognition of its peripheral 
Arctic role. By examining Chinese actions through the lens of exclusion-peripheralization 
theory, as well as the AC’s own evolution over the last two decades, this study sought to 
gauge the continuing viability of the AC. Evidence shows China is embarking on a 
campaign to restructure international perspectives on its Arctic capabilities, in line with 
its larger strategic ambitions, while also demonstrating an enthusiastic willingness to 
participate in both the AC’s current structure and new external knowledge networks and 
forums. While outside organizations have expanded as a result of the AC’s exclusivity 
and continued focus on environmental sustainability, they do not seem to pose a 
significant threat to the AC’s international value as an advocacy organization. 
Additionally, the AC’s gradual inclusion of other respected organizations has likely 
strengthened its validity, making it more desirable a platform in which emerging powers 
can claim association. However, as Arctic commercial prospects and dual-use joint 
research projects and institutions continue to increase along its periphery, an AC 
organizational restructure proffering greater inclusion and perhaps more binding 
intergovernmental agreements may be required. An examination of the Antarctic Treaty 
regime offers one such example of an international governance system where power is 
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derived from individual state scientific contributions rather than territory. This system 
required strong scientific and international leadership at its beginning, organizational 
flexibility through the end of the Cold War period, and continued international 








































Chapter 2: A Future Kalaallit Nunaat: Measuring U.S. and Chinese 
Influence Amidst Greenland’s Evolving Independence Movement 
 
Introduction 
 On August 29, 2017, Chinese polar research vessel Xue Long “Snow Dragon” 
weighed anchor in the Nuup Kangerlua fjord off Nuuk, Greenland and continued its 
mission to circumnavigate the Arctic Circle.108 Xue Long’s 20,000 nautical mile, 83-day 
journey — the icebreaker’s eighth mission to the polar regions — was widely heralded in 
Chinese state media for accomplishing multiple objectives: contributing to international 
science, advancing the BRI’s component “Silk Road on Ice”, and expanding global 
influence.109 International press coverage of the vessel’s presence off Nuuk proved to be 
a minor footnote in relation to heavy documentation of the ship’s ensuing voyage through 
the fabled Northwest Passage. However, Snow Dragon’s Greenland waypoint was 
nonetheless notable given the increase in China and Greenland’s commercial and 
diplomatic relationships over the last two decades in parallel with physical changes to 
Greenland’s environment and the island’s evolving independence movement. Despite this 
connection, Danish news outlets seemed to simply repeat wire services’ reporting of the 
research vessel’s connection to increased Arctic commercial shipping transits.110 Lacking 
was analysis of the low-profile Greenland visit, occurring just nine months after 
Denmark’s decision to terminate a Chinese development contract for Grønnedal, a former 
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U.S.-turned-Danish naval base on the island.111 This sudden reversal of Chinese 
commercial fortunes foreshadowed further 2018 U.S.-backed Danish denials of Chinese 
infrastructure development projects, domestically desired by Greenland, including three 
new airports in Nuuk, Illulisat, and Quarqurtoq.112 
 The geopolitical dynamics at play in Greenland, illustrated by the events 
surrounding Snow Dragon, have increased in complexity in parallel with China’s 
expanded Arctic activities as a self-professed “Near Arctic State.” As discussed in the 
introduction, a changing Arctic physical environment is dramatically altering the far 
north’s politics. A once regional socio-economic and diplomatic landscape is 
transforming to encompass wide-ranging global interests, which in turn further act upon 
the geopolitical domain. The continuing evolution of Greenland’s independence 
movement offers a window into this change. Historically a domestic dialogue between 
Greenland’s majority indigenous population and their former colonizer Denmark, the 
question of independence now involves pursuit of external sponsors, like China, to 
advance its development.113 Greenland’s openness to new parties, along with the island’s 
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strategic position and expanding access to its natural resource potential, have attracted 
greater Chinese diplomatic engagement, and resulting U.S. concerns.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to determine which entities, the U.S., Denmark, 
China, affiliated IOs, or other external powers are best postured to answer Greenland’s 
independence needs. It also attempts prediction on which might will hold relevancy 
following Greenland’s eventual independence. As Mia Bennett posits, future influence in 
the Arctic will likely be decided on which groups influence lasting changes to 
environmental protection, human security, and resource exploitation.114 Greenland offers 
unique socio-political perspectives on each of these concepts. Its contemporary 
independence narratives weave modern history with ancient Inuit cultural values. Much 
of its 20th century experience involves heavy Danish and U.S. military and diplomatic 
presence, and thus both states heavily factor into questions of its independence. In 
keeping with exclusion-peripheralization theory, by long marginalizing Greenland, the 
U.S. and Denmark have unintentionally incentivized the island’s pursuit of new, perhaps 
more beneficial relationships outside established norms. China’s Arctic activities have 
begun to come into focus with wide interpretations of its intent, including in Greenland. 
Despite a wealth of contemporary Arctic geopolitical literature, gaps remain in 
appropriately bridging Greenland’s specific independence convictions with the strengths 
and limitations of U.S., Danish, Chinese, and prominent IO Arctic policies. 
 Following a review of existing literature on on relevant state and IO activity in 
Greenland, focused primarily on the U.S., Denmark, and China, we will build our 
approach to questions of future influence in Greenland along historical, cultural, socio-
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economic, and diplomatic lines of evidence. Analysis will begin with a brief modern 
history of Greenland, cataloguing domestic relations with Denmark and international 
interactions focused on the U.S. and China. This scene-setter is designed to bring context 
to subsequent examination of Greenland’s contemporary independence rhetoric. It is 
important to note that not all Greenlanders’ opinions are represented here. Additionally, 
like other Euro-centric interpretations on Greenland’s motivations, this author 
acknowledges personal gaps in adequately relaying all aspects of cultural context. We 
will then embark on an individual study of China and the U.S.’s more recent policies 
toward Greenland from the perspective of each of Greenland’s main independence 
narratives. Larger NATO, West Nordic, and EU interactions are also included within this 
survey, but their roles are worthy of further study. Finally, we will forecast which entity 
is better positioned to answer Greenland’s future political, security, and economic 
requirements.  
 Since the 1970s, Arctic related literature has increasingly included human security 
dynamics in addition to more traditional discussion on stewardship of the physical 
environment.115 An increasing body of Constructivist-tending IR literature attempts to 
right this lack of recorded indigenous thought in Arctic policy discussion. Mark Jacobsen 
and Ulrik Gad offer excellent summary of Greenland’s cultural foundations for 
independence, built on competing motivations to preserve Inuit tradition while 
welcoming some forces of modernity.116 They join with Frank Sejersen and Marc Auchet 
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in explaining Greenland’s political reckoning of its colonial past, arguing 
“Greenlandicization” is highly motivated to reverse Denmark’s cultural and diplomatic 
precedences.117 All believe this accounts for Greenland’s tendencies to gravitate away 
from NATO; advocate for “sustainable development” rather than solely environmental 
protectionism; and empathize with with “new” regional actors like China, long regarded 
as an Arctic ‘Other’ by the West.118 These beliefs are at the root of Greenland’s 
independence vision and represent inroads for states wishing to engage with the island.  
 Previously elucidated in Chapter 1, Chinese Arctic motivations are diverse and 
evolve along with contribution from internal and external influence mechanisms. China’s 
interests in Greenland since 2013 display similar variances, demonstrated in resulting 
literature’s analysis and policy recommendations. Conclusions range from classifying 
Chinese activities as purely logical to more cynical (and at times patronizing) 
perspectives on its intent to exploit a vulnerable Greenland population. Realists such as 
Lau Blaxekjaer, Marc Lanteigne, Mingming Shi, and Deng Beixi define Chinese Arctic 
designs as “modest, pragmatic, and prudent,” with its Greenland interests in line with 
larger economic and science-based global expansion of influence, rather than a more 
sinister land grab.119 Aki Tonami agrees, arguing China is not exercising Arctic 
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revisionism but rather a “gradual rise.120 Beixi further points to China’s use of established 
diplomatic strategies, as well as its focus on advertising proficiency in infrastructure and 
engineering projects that appeal to Arctic customers like Greenland.121 U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) memorandums on the Arctic have increasingly used the phrase 
‘strategic competition’ and expressed skepticism on the underlying motives behind 
China’s use of regional science diplomacy and economic incentives.122 Since 2016, U.S. 
policy documents and speeches cite China’s militaristic activities in East Asia and 
exploitative relationships in Africa as warnings for Greenland’s potential future. 
Academics, like Camilla Sørensen and Mia Bennett, share the DoD’s concerns. Sørensen 
claims Greenland represents an avenue for China to achieve “great power influence,” 
which she believes supersedes more pragmatic interests like simple resource access.123 
Bennett argues China’s international revisionist strategy is being applied to the Arctic 
using a variety of diplomatic tools, including attempts to promote its own “Near Arctic 
Peoples,” as a means of ingratiating itself with Greenland’s majority indigenous 
population.124 Perhaps at least some of the critical observers are also in part affected by 
the “disproportional investment” potential of Greenland, given its population of only 
57,000, as compared to Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in more populous 
Arctic states.125 
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 Liberals see China’s Arctic interests as a potential boon for development of 
existing regional institutions, like the AC. Additionally, new “science diplomacy” forums 
that include traditionally ostracized state and non-state parties like China and Greenland 
are welcomed by many in the region who see a need for better synchronizing the interests 
of commercial and environmental stakeholders.126 Su and Mayer define science 
diplomacy “as a set of practices that open up sustained channels of communication and 
cooperation for the main purpose of producing objective knowledge,” with an emphasis 
on multilateralism. They argue that this new diplomacy track serves as a “stabilizing” 
force, especially in developing geopolitical theaters like the Arctic.127 Even the realist-
leaning Bennett and Sørensen promote the idea of science-diplomacy forums for setting 
cooperative precedences for “extraregional” actors like China.128 Blaxekjaer, Lanteigne, 
and Shi argue for including greater joint participation in science diplomacy between West 
Nordic countries and China as part of an embrace of a liberal “World Society.”129 
Greenland potentially benefits from such a transition from state-dominated discourse, 
given its tenuous position between traditional statehood and a less defined indigenous 
cultural space. 
 Analysis of the U.S.’s interests in Greenland remain primarily focused on its 
military history with some very recent discussion in academic and media sources on U.S. 
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influence operations against prospective Chinese projects. Overall analysis on the health 
of U.S. Arctic diplomatic structures are more limited. Annika Nilsson offers the most 
comprehensive examination to date on the U.S.’s Arctic diplomatic institutions, 
cataloging evolving themes that define U.S. strategy. She joins with Katherine 
Weingartner and Robert Orttung in arguing U.S. Arctic policy efforts have largely 
depended on, and can be predicted by, the individual doctrines of modern presidential 
administrations.130 Nilsson notes an overall “broadening” of U.S. Arctic security 
perspective from one anchored by self-interested economic and defensive motivations to 
a one placing value on cooperation. However, she claims there remains a consistent 
“economic development and competitiveness” theme.131 Her opinion significantly differs 
with Heather Conley who concludes U.S. Arctic policy has “largely remained stagnant,” 
since the Cold War era despite radical shifts in Arctic international politics.132 
Particularly significant to analysis of the U.S.-Greenland relationship is Nilsson’s 
emphasis on the historical U.S. position towards indigenous issues, which has only 
gradually changed over the last three decades. 
 All Arctic states, and the greater international community, will be affected by 
Greenland’s eventual independence. Arguably Denmark, the U.S., China and respective 
alliance systems stand the most to gain, or lose, depending on which entities Greenland 
gravitates towards in the coming years. The U.S. and Denmark, remain strategically 
invested in the island nation. However, over the last decade, China has pursued bilateral 
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scientific and resource access agreements across the Arctic region, including directly with 
Greenland tied to its larger BRI, often colloquially called the “Silk Road on Ice.” The 
remainder of this paper will seek to illustrate the ideal methods to address Greenland’s 
independence needs, and determine which entities are succeeding in maintaining and/or 
establishing connections with the island. 
Modern History of Greenland: Setting the Stage for External Interests 
 Greenland’s modern social movements are closely linked to its former role as a 
Danish colony from the late 1700s to 1953, post-colonial governance, and strategic 
military and commercial geography. U.S. interests on the island began during WWI, 
when it first considered purchase of the territory, and continued through WWII given 
Greenland’s strategic position in the middle of the North Atlantic. During Nazi 
Germany’s occupation of Denmark, the U.S. began its military presence on the island as 
a preemptive measure to stop attacks on the American continent and establish a logistics 
hub. In the first modern defense agreement between the U.S. and Denmark signed in 
1941, the U.S. formerly recognized Danish sovereignty over its Greenland territory, but 
simultaneously assumed the role of wartime protector of the kingdom’s “native 
Greenland and Danish populations.”133 At the conclusion of WWII, incipient Cold War 
considerations led the U.S. to again pursue ownership over the island. Ultimately, the 
U.S. compromised by signing the April 1951 “Defense of Greenland” Agreement, 
permitting free and continued U.S. military access to Greenland in support of Danish and 
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U.S. joint NATO commitments. Notably, the agreement’s only mention of Greenland’s 
native population was provided in a negative context within Article VI, where it stated, 
“every effort will be made to avoid any contact between United States personnel and the 
local population which the Danish authorities do not consider desirable for the conduct of 
operations under this Agreement.”134 Soon after, the U.S. expanded its existing base at 
Thule, which involved the coerced removal of its former indigenous inhabitants.135 
 Greenland became an administrative district of Denmark in 1953. During this 
time, Greenland underwent what Marc Auchet describes as a “Danisization,” movement 
where indigenous communities adopted many of the trappings and ideologies of the 
modern Western European lifestyle. However, this also created a lasting tension between 
Inuit and industrialized traditions, belief systems, and values. The 1970s saw the first 
official reckoning of this friction with Greenland’s establishment of three organic 
political parties, transition to greater official use of Greenland’s native language, and 
increased calls for independence.136 These developments culminated in the 1979 
establishment of Home Rule, whereby Denmark afforded Greenland oversight over its 
own domestic policies.137 Greenland’s steps towards further independence, including 
complete sovereignty over foreign policy matters, continued for the next two decades 
with the U.S. base at Thule coming under more scrutiny during the late Cold War period. 
Additionally, during the 1980s-1990s, Greenland made its first attempts to independently 
court international investors for its mining and fishing industries.138  
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 The 1996 establishment of the AC represented a significant opportunity for 
Greenland’s exercise of independent foreign policy, via the inclusion of a Permanent 
Members organizational body, made up of representatives of the Arctic’s indigenous 
peoples. Notably, the U.S. was initially against including non-state, tribal entities within 
the organization, but eventually conceded.139 The 1990s also saw the first commercial 
engagements between Greenland and China in what became a failed seal sausage 
enterprise and a moderately successful seafood trade. However, a controversial 2001 
football match between Tibet and Greenland that celebrated colonized indigenous 
peoples, led to strained relations.140  
 The early 2000s featured more progress towards independence and international 
commercial interest, marked by the 2009 Self-Government Agreement (SGA). The SGA 
established a framework for Greenland’s complete independence, with a block grant 
system of Danish financial assistance beginning at a yearly contribution of 3.439 million 
Danish Kroner.141 The block grant system continues through the present, with a planned 
obsolescence following Greenland’s demonstration of a viable, independent economy. 
The SGA’s overarching economic incentive is credited with bolstering international 
investment, but also changing what was once a “moral” independence movement to one 
now reliant on achievement of an independent economy.142 China notably sent delegates 
to Greenland’s official 21 June 2009 celebration of the SGA.143 The reliance on 
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independent economy was further manifested in Greenland’s 2013 passing of the Large 
Scale Projects Act, which facilitated the growth of foreign development projects.144 
Shortly after the Large Scale Projects Act was signed, China reopened investment 
interests in Greenland by sending members of its Chinese Development Bank and state-
run mining companies to the island in July 2013.145 Chinese investments continued in 
Greenland, totaling $2 billion between 2012-2017, the largest percentage based on GDP 
of any state in China’s $89.2 billion Arctic infrastructure-focused portfolio. China’s 
overall Arctic investment is estimated as $1.4 trillion.146 China’s specific mineral 
investment interests, and infrastructure project proposals, tied to both commercial and 
strategic motivations will be examined shortly.  
 U.S. influence on the island and within intra-Danish-Greenland relations featured 
several developments during the early 2000s. The most promising, and later 
disappointing, was the 2004 establishment of the Joint Committee between the U.S., 
Greenland Home Rule government, and Denmark.147 This was an attempt to move 
beyond a defense-focused relationship, with the parties pursuing greater “scientific, 
environmental, economic, commercial, and educational” partnerships.148 Less desirable 
were controversial rendition flights through Greenland in support of post 9-11 
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intelligence operations.149 Perhaps the most discouraging modern U.S. decision was the 
2014 cancellation of its lucrative servicing contract with local Greenland Contractors, 
which supplied Thule base for over forty years with an annual domestic revenue of $89 
million. The highly publicized 2019 statement by President Trump offering to again 
purchase Greenland served to rekindle Greenland’s negative sentiments on indefinite, 
free U.S. basing access, and continued frustration over the failure of the Joint 
Committee.150 
Voices of Greenland’s Independence Movement 
 The themes of Greenland’s modern independence movement match well with 
Bennett’s theory on future Arctic influence mentioned in the introduction. Now outfitted 
with historical background, we will explore Greenland's modern independence rhetoric 
covering political, security, resource exploitation, and environmental themes. As with any 
societal study, each of these topics are complex, and this section does not profess to 
represent every Greenlander’s vision of an independent Kalaallit Nunaat. After all, a 
2019 study found that while 55 percent of Greenlanders believe political independence is 
important, and predict this number will reach an overwhelming majority by 2035, only 37 
percent would be expected to vote in favor of complete independence today.151 However, 
this section does seek to bring attention to the preeminent issues that continue to shape 
international interaction and attraction to the island nation. In the case of external 
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relationships, some dominant aspects of contemporary independence perspectives, 
particularly sustainable development goals, are favorable to outside would be investors 
given alignment with traditional Western Arctic policy perspectives and China’s BRI 
ambitions. Greenland’s overall foreign policy and defense preferences are more 
concerning to the U.S. when considering an increasingly open Arctic political and 
economic space. While most reviewed academic literature focuses on Greenland’s 
political and international discourse, it must again be reiterated that many recent 
developments are again affected by environmental change, which offers more open year 
around access and movement for Greenlanders and foreign entities alike.  
The “Greenlandicization” movement as Sejersen, Auchet, Gad, and Jacobsen have 
described, is based on a pursuit of political distance from many of Denmark’s established 
foreign relationships.152 Of particular concern to the U.S. and Denmark is the potential 
gravitation away from NATO towards less established regional constructs. Compared to 
other Nordic states, Denmark’s foreign policy alignment, founded on defense issues, has 
always tended towards NATO and away from the EU and Nordic Council. For example, 
as Bailes describes, while it belongs to the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), 
Denmark has refused to take part in the Nordic Battle Group’s support to the EU.153 
Greenland on the other hand, celebrates its independent alignment with the West Nordic 
Council, which does not include Denmark, and has been a staunch proponent of the EU’s 
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acceptance as an official AC Observer.154 In return for its support via the Association of 
the Overseas Countries and Territories of the European Union (OCTA), Greenland enjoys 
a 187 million Kroner yearly educational grant from the EU.155 Notably, the West Nordic 
Council has been particularly warm to Chinese Arctic investment, via its “5+1” dialogue 
on possible Polar Silk Road development projects, and Iceland in particular’s numerous 
joint projects.156 Denmark’s own relationship with China is complex given its domestic 
interests in Chinese partnerships, yet simultaneous concerns for similar projects in 
Greenland.157  
Inuit cultural tradition and Greenland’s long history of U.S. military use 
contribute to an aversion to defense dialogues. Thus, this aspect of autonomous 
statehood, one routinely exercised between NATO partners like the U.S. and Denmark, is 
not prioritized among native Greenlanders. Jacobsen and Gad argue that the Inuit concept 
of ‘security’ is instead tied to civil services, not militarization.158 Rasmus Rasmussen, 
Kristian Kristensen and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen expand on this description, with 
Rasmussen calling Greenland’s culture one of “desecuritization” where a “peaceful high 
north” is considered ideal. In Greenland, priority is given to expanding economic and 
environmental opportunities rather than security-related foreign policy agendas.159 
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Rasmussen adds that while this conceptual disconnect between Greenland, Denmark, and 
the U.S. is not likely to lead to Greenland’s immediate post-independence exit from 
NATO, it remains a challenging hurdle in discussion among the three governments.160 
Given Greenland’s cultural disaffection with Western defense concepts, the U.S. and 
other states would be well served to distance themselves from strategic rhetoric when 
discussing Greenland’s future. 
Although not lacking in ironies given China’s own human rights record, 
Greenland’s movement away from established Danish norms also includes sympathetic 
themes towards other groups, including China, traditionally viewed as Arctic outsiders. 
This concept, discussed at length by Gad et al., has a complicated modern history given 
Greenland’s past criticism of China’s relationship to its colonized peoples.161 However, 
Gad et al., Jacobsen and Gad, and Sejersen all note Greenland’s recent outspoken 
admiration for the relative cultural sensitivities displayed by Chinese investors and 
diplomatic teams, in comparison to Danish and other “Euro-centrist” delegations. The 
authors also allude to more subtle ethnic sentiments on closer genetic kinships with 
Eastern peoples.162 This is not to say that Greenlanders do not share some wariness with 
the U.S. and other Western states over potential Chinese projects and related habitation 
on the island. Given its low population density, any significant Chinese or other 
developer’s presence would be immediately felt, and despite ethnic empathies, would 
                                                 
160 Rasmussen, “The Desecuritization of Greenland’s Security?” 2, 4. 
161 Gad et al., “Imagining China on Greenland’s Road to Independence,” 2-3. 
162 Gad et al., “Imagining China on Greenland’s Road to Independence,” 6; Jacobsen and Gad, “Setting the 




likely still elicit concern.163 Environmental concerns related to mining practices and 
impact on waterways, fisheries, and significant cultural and local economical landmarks 
are also present, as evidenced in several small protests organized against the intended 
practices of mining companies.164 While Greenland is most likely to align itself to other 
indigenous groups within the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), cultural awareness is a an 
important value that must be considered in state interactions.  
Greenland’s perspective on environmental conservation is one that aligns more 
closely with commercially-minded entities’ views on the Arctic’s economic promise. 
Unlike the majority of the AC’s member states, Greenland’s indigenous interests, 
communicated through the ICC, have long advocated for “sustainable development” of 
Arctic resources, encouraging exploitation rather than pursuing policies of complete 
environmental protectionism. This is a particularly relevant break from Denmark’s more 
mainstream Arctic environmental policy, given Denmark’s membership within the AC is 
geographically contingent on its Greenland territory.165 Greenland’s pursuit of economic 
independence, codified in the SGA and Large Scale Projects Act, is thereby closely 
related to this more utilitarian environmental perspective. Thus, while international 
support for establishing a similar construct in the Arctic to the Antarctic Treaty as 
discussed in Chapter 1 is still developing, Greenland would almost certainly be opposed 
given the Treaty’s moratorium on resource exploitation. 
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A great deal of Greenland’s modernity dialogues are focused on economic 
investment, seen by many after the SGA as the primary means for delivering 
independence. Not lost however, is a concern over the potential social consequences of 
such rapid development.166 An important aspect of “Greenlandicization” focuses on 
achieving domestic prerequisites prior to external investment.167 Without improvements 
in education, infrastructure, and population stability, Page Wilson cautions, foreign 
investment is less likely to benefit Greenlanders themselves.168 Culturally-based studies 
on indigenous entrepreneurial activities, have also placed emphasis on the importance of 
“communal” factors like support to “local cultural pride, family, and place” in addition to 
gaining economic autonomy.169 Additionally, not all studies of Greenland’s aspirational 
industrial economy agree that political independence should be contingent on complete 
economic independence. Adam Grydehøj criticizes this common success metric arguing, 
that readiness for independence should instead be measured by a state’s ability to 
independently engage with other sovereign states on areas of economic development, 
which can then facilitate further self-sufficiency.170 Thus, diplomatic dialogues with 
Greenland should address other aspects of development as well, especially the furthering 
of educational and other opportunities for social mobility. 
The interplay of factors involved in independence movements, can complicate 
engagement efforts by other state or non-state parties. When considering post-colonial 
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societies like Greenland, norms established by former colonizers can be expected to 
change, potentially altering established geopolitical structures. In the Arctic’s case, this 
could include future impacts to the AC and NATO, and alliance shifts within the EU and 
Nordic Councils. Those entities seeking future cooperation with an independent 
Greenland, including the U.S. and China, should be well aware of Greenland’s unique 
positions on regional politics, defense, and issues of economy versus environmental 
sustainability. In the following two sections, focus will be on how successfully China and 
the U.S.’s Arctic activities and policies have answered Greenland’s unique independence 
concerns. Further study should be undertaken on EU, Western Nordic, other NATO 
states, and additional stakeholders’ involvement on the island vis-a-vis Greenland’s 
cultural mores.  
Analysis of Chinese Inroads 
 Both IR theory camps discussed in the introduction’s literature review tell 
portions of the greater Greenland engagement story. China does have strategic and 
commercial interests in mind on the island in line with the BRI, given Greenland’s ideal 
position in relation to all three of the Arctic’s identified shipping routes, especially the 
future Transpolar Route, and potential for new mineral and fossil fuel extraction access. 
According to the 2008 U.S. Geological Survey cited in the introduction, undiscovered oil 
reserves are estimated at 7.3 billion barrels and 52 trillion cubic feet of natural gas is 
believed to be extant in the region of western Greenland and eastern Canada.171 However, 
China is also keenly aware of remaining environmental, diplomatic, and social 
constraints. This has led senior Chinese government officials to advise SOEs to 
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independently approach new ventures through established engagement methods and 
based on cautious appraisal of potential project's market benefits.172 Despite glacial melt 
and greater exposure of natural resources, Greenland still presents very arduous 
challenges. This translates to costly investments up front when initiating mining or 
infrastructure projects there, new types of extraction equipment with which Chinese 
companies are unfamiliar, and uncharted regulations.173 The tenuous relationship between 
Denmark, the U.S., and Greenland does not help, and has led to China largely accepting a 
more cautionary approach as compared to its numerous projects in nearby Iceland and 
elsewhere in the Arctic region. To overcome some of these obstacles, China has once 
again turned towards bilateral deals and multilateral science diplomatic forums to assist 
with its engagement and to smooth over concerns on its intentions. 
 As of this writing, Chinese companies have either partnered with firms in the 
U.K. and Australia, or pursued unilateral projects to extract zinc at Citronen Fjord, 
copper at Wegener Halvø, iron at Isua, and rare earth elements (REE) at Kvanefjeld, 
Greenland. Additionally, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) are eyeing the island’s fossil fuel 
resources.174 The Kvanefjeld REE project offers the greatest assessed value ($1.4 billion), 
in addition to providing what China considers a highly strategic resource.175 According to 
Andersson et al., other projects, such as Citronen Fjord are likely of interest primarily as 
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a means for regional access versus acquisition of the actual resource (Figure 4).176 
However, given Greenland’s lack of infrastructure (including an inability to maintain 
highway or other transport systems through its challenging topography), its small 
population size, and global market fluctuations, mining on the island still poses a risk to 
investors.177 Likely as a result, China and Greenland have begun opening up other 
markets (tourism, fur trade, and fisheries),178 and looked for projects that address other 
mutual needs. 
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Figure 4. Chinese mining investments on Greenland.179 
 With Iceland as a regional development model,180 Greenland considered Chinese 
firms for several of its critical infrastructure projects between 2016-2018, a decision that 
put its goals at odds with both Denmark and the U.S. strategic interests. As Gad et al. 
explain, Greenland continues to “cast China” as the most capable asset for gaining 
political independence through economic development.181 However, despite Greenland’s 
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interest, evidence shows that it remains subject to the larger strategic maneuvers of its 
former colonizer and the U.S. In 2016, a potential deal between Hong Kong-based 
General Nice Group and Greenland to purchase a former Danish naval base at Grønnedal, 
located near the Isua iron mine, fell through after Denmark decided to withdraw its sale. 
This is believed to have occurred after prompt intervention by the U.S. given its security 
concerns over Chinese port access.182  
 In 2017, Greenland and China began negotiating their most ambitious 
collaboration to date, the construction by China Communications Construction Company 
of three airports in Nuuk, Quarqurtoq, and Illulisat. What ensued was a flurry of 
diplomatic activity between the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland, which abruptly halted the 
projects. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis cautioned such a project would 
assist in China’s “militarization” of the Arctic.183 In what was seen as a clear 
appeasement of U.S. interests, Denmark countered the China Communications 
Construction Company with its own government-funded offer. China subsequently issued 
a statement on having a “one Denmark [diplomatic] policy,” and the Chinese company 
dropped its own offer. Greenland’s Partii Naleraq, which is represents independence 
interests, responded by exiting Greenland's government.184  
 In addition to mining and infrastructure projects, China has also approached some 
of Greenland’s expressed social welfare needs, specifically in providing better access to 
education and improved exposure to regional scientific exchanges. CNARC’s projects, 
described in more detail in Chapter 1, address several of Greenland’s expressed 
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development and civil service goals. CNARC also serves China’s interests in helping to 
navigate the complex domestic dynamics between Greenland and its former colonizer, a 
situation which China has previously attempted to avoid.185 Representing one remaining 
source of interest overlap for Greenland and Denmark, the center has coordinated joint 
scientific expeditions between the two states.186 CNARC also assists Denmark in subtly 
satisfying its own development goals, and keeping an amiable relationship with 
Greenland while monitoring Chinese interactions with its former colony.187 
 Chinese science diplomacy with Greenland does not end with CNARC. In 2016, 
Greenland’s Education, Culture, Research, and Church Ministry and China’s State 
Oceanic Administration signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a new 
scientific research station on the island. In keeping with its desire for furthering modern 
infrastructure and science, Greenland’s Institute of Natural Resources and TeleGreenland 
and China’s Beijing Normal University have also openly considered constructing a 
Nuuk-based satellite ground receiver.188 U.S. and Danish reactions to these developments 
continue through the present, with the July 2020 meetings between U.S. Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederisen the most recent 
exchange on concerns of Chinese encroachment.189 As detailed in Chapter 1, China has 
used scientific research station agreements throughout the Arctic to bridge its scientific 
and commercial interests, with stations typically preceding bilateral energy or 
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infrastructure development deals. It is thus no coincidence that the Chinese-Greenland 
MOU occurred soon after the passage of the Large Scale Projects Act and in the midst of 
additional cooperative activities between the Geographical Survey of Denmark and 
Greenland and China’s Academy of Geological Science.190 Soon after the MOU, China 
began a Greenland tourism promotion campaign and established new mineral extraction 
plans.191 China and Greenland continued advancing education and cultural exchanges in 
2018 during a meeting between Greenland’s Minister for Independence, Foreign Affairs 
and Agriculture, and the Chinese Ambassador to Denmark.192 The MOUs address both 
Greenland’s social and economic development goals. 
 It is notable that Greenland’s 2016-2018 pursuit of educational cooperation with 
China coincided with renewed attempts by the Obama Administration to set up U.S.-led 
international scientific exchanges during its chairmanship of the AC.193 This 
demonstrates Greenland’s interest in new peripheral partnerships even when the U.S. 
signals cooperation outside of a military context: a potentially concerning development. 
Greenland’s aforementioned desire to improve its higher educational system remains part 
of its development priorities, and it appears willing to satisfy those needs by partnering 
with states demonstrating consistent commitment to Arctic research. 
 China’s pursuit of commercial development and cooperation in Arctic science-
diplomacy forums has led to new partnerships and positive perceptions of its regional 
intent. Aki Tonami argues this is part of China’s overall strategy of “incremental 
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advancement,” that avoids controversy within new spheres of influence.194 China views 
Nordic states as particularly amiable to its overtures, with Iceland considered most 
receptive to Chinese development given numerous established joint projects between the 
two countries.195 As mentioned in the history section, China has also tracked Greenland’s 
independence movement closely. In light of various IR theories, China’s mixed staff of 
diplomatic and commercial representatives during official visits to the island is certainly 
open to analyst interpretation. However, given Greenland’s interests in economic 
development outside of Danish influence, the island will likely continue to be receptive to 
investment opportunities.  
 Diplomatic ties between Greenland and China provide wanted access for both 
states. For China, Greenland represents another Arctic state gained in its nascent regional 
sphere of influence outside of more exclusionary structures. Once the Northwest Passage, 
Northern Sea Route, and potentially the Transpolar Route open for longer seasonal 
periods, Greenland offers a deep water waypoint on the shorter shipping route between 
Asia and Europe.196 For Greenland, ties with China offer advancement of its autonomous 
foreign policy. More importantly, following the SGA, China serves a potential high value 
customer for development of Greenland’s mining, infrastructure, and social development 
projects. The overall domestic reaction to continued U.S. and Danish intervention in 
Chinese development projects is yet unclear. However, given Greenland’s desire for 
greater autonomy, outside prevention of proposed projects without suitable alternative 
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development solutions is likely to increase resentment towards the U.S. and its former 
colonizer.  
Analysis of U.S. Inroads 
 Unlike China, the U.S. has a long, controversial history within Greenland. 
Inextricably linked to Denmark due to longstanding NATO partnership and military 
activities, U.S. intentions are likely to continue to promote skepticism. Several enduring 
elements of historical U.S. interaction with Greenland are particularly relevant to today’s 
analysis of Greenland’s independence narratives and questions of the U.S.’s future 
influence. From multiple attempts at purchasing the island, to present day DoD policies 
and an April 2020 $12.1 million aid package,197 the U.S. approach towards Greenland 
can easily be interpreted as self-serving, patronizing, or dismissive. U.S. official policy 
prioritizing state-to-state interaction with Denmark, and furtive attempts to undermine 
aforementioned development projects expressly desired by Greenlanders, do little to 
advance positive perceptions. Recognition of Greenland and its people remain primarily 
within the context of strategic perspectives, a militarized concept irreconcilable to Inuit 
pacifist cultural traditions.198  
Cold War-era nuclear weapons storage, strategic bomber basing, the displacement 
of native peoples at Thule, post-911 rendition flights, and Thule’s 2014 cancellation of 
Greenland Contractors have all contributed to what Olesen calls a “healthy mistrust of 
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U.S. interests.”199 Despite this friction, contemporary U.S. military activities on 
Greenland do not rise to the level of what Nilsson calls a de facto U.S. military 
“colonization” of Greenland exhibited during the Cold War. During this era, Nilsson 
explains, the U.S. military imposed “direction, culture, and rules,” to all U.S. Arctic 
activities, including scientific research.200 An increasingly open Arctic, and expanding 
international interests, could also result in a return to some Cold War strategic footing on 
Greenland. Perhaps acting in the U.S.’s favor in terms of overall perception is Denmark’s 
continued role as the central object of Greenland’s criticism for any controversial 
occurrences on the island. This tends to absolve offending external parties like the U.S.201 
Independence from Denmark may change this dynamic. The U.S. would do well to study 
its past relationships with the island and critically examine Greenland’s independence 
goals.  
As noted, individual policy preferences of U.S. presidential administrations has 
been the primary determiner of the nation’s general position toward the Arctic and 
Greenland.202 U.S. policy inclusion of indigenous people has historically been driven by 
the scientific community, commercial development motivations, or from administrations 
that place significant value on furthering Arctic science agendas.203 From Greenland’s 
perspectives on political, security, and development, the U.S. has shown both promise 
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and irregularity. On political and strategic fronts, the U.S. seems to have evolved from a 
position of overtly opposing indigenous inclusion within the AC to embracing 
cooperation and shared concern for the region. Even before 1996, Arctic indigenous 
issues were occasionally raised in U.S. policy, although typically in the context of 
negotiating Alaskan development projects or when closely tied to U.S. scientific analysis. 
This is apparent in discussion surrounding the 1971 National Security Decision 
Memorandum 144, 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act, and 1990 establishment of the 
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC).204 The 21st century movement towards 
directly engagement with Arctic indigenous peoples is observed in language included 
within the George W. Bush Administration’s 2004 establishment of the Joint Committee 
and 2009 National and Homeland Security Directives.205 
Collaboration with indigenous and other non-AC state entities was very apparent 
during the Obama Administration. Examples include the administration’s attempts to 
establish the U.S.’s own science-based forums in the 2015 Global Leadership in the 
Arctic Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement, and Resilience (GLACIER) conference, 
which President Obama himself attended, and the 2016 Arctic Science Ministerial (ASM) 
meeting.206 The 2016 ASM notably included China among twenty-four other 
participants.207 The ASM, first envisioned in 2009 by the Bush Administration was 
orchestrated by two internal Arctic policy institutions that received substantial support 
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during the Obama era: the United States Arctic Research Commission (ARC) and the 
Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC). The latter was established by the 
Administration. In addition, the Obama Administration met regularly with the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Finally, former Secretary of State Clinton’s 
participation at the 2011 AC meeting, the first U.S. Secretary of State to do so, was 
widely lauded.208 
While the Obama Administration did not emphasize strategic competition in the 
Arctic, it did create the 2013 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which became 
the foundation for additional DoD and service-specific Arctic policies. Unlike traditional 
defense policy, this document placed a premium on diplomacy and the use of regional 
partnerships to enhance human and environmental security.209 Arctic security issues and 
cooperation with indigenous groups continued to be routinely added to policy documents, 
with residual Obama era-guidelines seen in the 2016 OSDP “Report to Congress on 
Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region,” and 
2017 agreement on international scientific cooperation. The first focused on building or 
expanding regional partnerships like the Joint Arctic Command and Joint Rescue 
Coordination Center initiative between the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland.210 The second 
aimed to promote scientific collaboration between AC member states, including 
provisions to expand multinational educational opportunities as well.211  
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Trump Administration Greenland policies have taken shape under the combined 
leadership of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, former Defense Secretary Mattis, 
and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. While elements of Obama-era internal 
institutions and emphasis on regional cooperation remained through the beginning of the 
Mattis and Tillerson period, current Administration trends cast Greenland and the Arctic 
in general as an arena for strategic competition with China and Russia, and a potential 
boon for the U.S.’s own resource extraction activities.212 These two themes are not 
necessarily at odds, exemplified but a 2017 $43 billion liquified natural gas (LNG) deal 
between Alaska and China.213 While most of the Arctic institutions created or heavily 
supported by the Obama Administration remain, nearly all have either been circumvented 
in the policy making processes or have had sustained gaps in their leadership. This can be 
seen in the lack of an OSTP head until August 2018 and general lack of policy influence, 
removal of the State Department’s U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic, and the 
freezing of AESC meetings within the National Security Council.214  
Current Arctic policy decisions, seen in the highly publicized August 2019 offer 
by President Trump to purchase Greenland, now appear to originate within a small circle 
of President Trump’s trusted advisors. The purchasing offer as well as the increasingly 
hard stance towards Chinese Arctic activities expressed in updated 2019 DoD policies 
and by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during the May 2019 AC ministerial meeting in 
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Rovaniemi, Finland have surprised Arctic regional diplomats. This was particularly 
apparent when the AC failed to pass a culminating declaration following Pompeo’s 2019 
speech, and the U.S. delegation’s rejection of mentioning climate change or sustainability 
themes in a joint AC statement.215 
As Nilsson posits, the Trump Administration’s return to an Arctic priority 
committed to commercial development, is more consistent with the development rhetoric 
of many Greenlanders.216 However, its chosen method for interceding in foreign 
developments in Greenland, via Denmark, continues to be unpopular among 
Greenlanders.217 As already discussed on potential 2016-2018 Chinese infrastructure 
deals, quiet U.S. negotiations with Denmark to stop these projects were taken as another 
example of an untrustworthy and strategic-focused power that ignored Greenlanders’ 
expressed goals for greater autonomy.  
Time will tell whether the U.S.’s own recent overtures, included within a 2019 
mineral exploitation MOU, expressed interest in constructing “dual-use” airports on the 
island, April 2020 aid package, and June 2020 opening of a U.S. consulate in Nuuk will 
tip the balance in favor of U.S. influence.218 The U.S.’s 2020 aid package, tailored 
towards education and natural resource development, sparked political frustration in 
Denmark. However, it is a step towards the type and method of direct interaction modern 
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Greenlanders value.219 Greenlanders are sure to see the underlying strategic motivations 
in these U.S. counteroffers to potential Chinese deals. Namely, simultaneous U.S. desires 
to maintain free access to Thule, slow Chinese or Russian influence gain in the region, 
and retain Greenland territory within NATO control.220 However, given Greenland’s 
prioritization of economic stimuli and political independence, the U.S. may find success 
despite its controversial history on the island. This would be better ensured if diplomatic 
gestures are constructed with cultural and political considerations in mind.  
Conclusion 
 Greenland will very likely continue to serve as a window into greater regional, 
and international Arctic dynamics. The island’s independence movement exemplifies 
many elements of changing geopolitical space. Historically a domestic and regional 
discussion, focused on indigenous liberation, Greenland’s independence now involves 
significant interaction with external actors in the pursuit of economic independence. This 
chapter identified several important themes for guiding productive interaction with 
Greenland, following an examination of its modern history and social movements. 
Greenland’s prioritization of economic development and civil service improvements, 
over defense-related or traditional environmental protection themes should be considered 
paramount in future diplomatic exchanges. Additionally, Greenland’s desire to distance 
itself from Denmark’s precedencies, demonstrates the importance of direct, culturally-
aware interaction with Greenland’s own government.  
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 China’s engagement with Greenland outside of traditional state boundaries, as 
well as its significant investment in Arctic bilateral development, has demonstrated to 
many Greenlanders the merits of future commercial partnership with the emerging Arctic 
power. The U.S., meanwhile, has a long and controversial history with Greenland, given 
its continued uninvited military presence and tendency to approach Greenland-related 
issues via Denmark. However, internal U.S. institutional changes enacted following the 
establishment of the AC, and accelerated from 2013 onward, demonstrate the promises of 
greater diplomatic flexibility. An emphasis on cooperation during the Obama 
Administration served to enhance state and non-state Arctic interaction. While the Trump 
Administration has bypassed many of these diplomatic institutions and downgraded 
science-related policy, its promotion of Arctic commercial development, and recent direct 
economic and civil service aid exchanges with the Nuuk government, do satisfy many of 
Greenland’s immediate needs. While this chapter also explored other potential outside 
influencers of Greenland, additional study is recommended on the island’s coordination 
with greater NATO states, Nordic Council, and the EU. The most advantageous 
international approach to Greenland would combine the promotion of non-traditional 
regional partnership forums with well-articulated development proposals. The latter 
closely mirroring Greenland’s expressed needs. Additional time is required to adequately 
predict how external state and IO actions will affect influence in a future independent 
Greenland. However, success will likely come to the entity that consistently demonstrates 
alignment with an autonomous Greenland’s cultural mores and socio-economic goals, 





Chapter 3: The Northern Sea Route: Heralding the Arrival of China as 




 Russia’s Arctic coastline spans 24,140 kilometers, over half of the Arctic’s littoral 
landmass. Climate change is eroding the region’s ice-covered waterways for longer 
seasonal periods, opening access to navigable sea routes (predicted to be ice-free by the 
2040s) and natural resources.221 The former are comprised of the Northern Sea Route 
(NSR), spanning between the Bering Strait and the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, and the 
Northeast Passage (NEP), which continues the journey to Murmansk and the Barents Sea 
(Figure 5). During the late 16th century, Dutch and English explorers focused on 
bypassing the natural barrier of Novaya Zemlya, but due to impenetrable ice fields, it was 
not until the late 19th century that a successful transit to Asia occurred.222 Novaya Zemlya 
still serves as the boundary for the two modern maritime transit routes; however, 
documents covering the geopolitical issues of Russia’s high north frequently abbreviate 
both routes simply as the NSR.223 The combination is notable in itself given an 
anticipated increase in through-shipping between Northern Europe and Asia in the 
coming decades. 
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Figure 5. The Northern Sea Route spans across Russia’s Arctic territory from the Bering Strait to the 
Barents Sea.224 
 
 Modern use of the NSR began during the Soviet era’s industrial build-up of the 
Arctic, and following USSR’s collapse, opened to the international community in 1991. 
Though the route’s shipping traffic remains primarily domestic, international interest has 
expanded over the last two decades given the potential for shorter transit times between 
northern European and Asian ports. Distances between some city pairs could theoretically 
be reduced to 75% via an open NSR.225 As the world’s largest merchant ship owning and 
building nation, China has taken notice of the NSR in line with its other Arctic 
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endeavors.226 In addition to possible logistic and strategic merits of the East-West 
shipping route, China is especially keen on gaining access to the NSR region’s energy 
resources. 
 Russia’s coast and adjoining sea areas, including the contested Lomonosov and 
Mendeleev ridges, are believed to hold 60% of the Arctic’s untapped oil. Furthermore, an 
estimated 926 billion cubic meters of liquified natural gas (LNG) is deposited on the 
Yamal Peninsula, nestled just southeast of the scythe-like Novaya Zemlya archipelago.227 
This peninsula is scene to Russia’s premier Arctic development project, Yamal LNG 
(Figure 6).228 With climate change expanding the seasonal viability of the NSR and 
increasing international pressure to find cleaner energy sources, LNG supply lines to 
eastern Asia and northern Europe are anticipated to grow. Shipping from the Yamal LNG 
project will likely mirror seasonal accesses and human needs in the near future, with the 
summer season dedicated to powering Asia’s air conditioning and winter —when eastern 
transits are more challenging— directed at Europe’s heating requirements.229 However, 
climate change is expected to provide increasingly year around access to the site. The 
Yamal project’s current investors include Russia’s Novatek corporation (50.1% stake), 
France’s Total (20%), Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (20%), and following 
2014 sanctions imposed by the West in response to the annexation of Crimea, by China’s 
Silk Road Fund (9.9%). Chinese banks also provided $12 billion in loans to the project in 
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addition to the Silk Road Fund purchase. Once complete, Yamal LNG will provide 10% 
of the world’s total LNG, and Russia has plans to expand its LNG production to five 
other Arctic sites.230 In June 2019, ‘Novatek’ and ‘Gazprombank’ established a 
partnership with China’s ‘Sinopec’ to further open the Chinese energy market, the 
world’s main LNG consumer.231 China’s stake in these and other Russian infrastructure 
projects are outwardly commercial, but given China’s greater Arctic strategic ambitions, 
their involvement is worthy of more detailed study. Additionally, China’s domestic 
incentive to move beyond more polluting sources of energy like coal is taking shape 
around new sources of importable energy, with a focus on LNG.232  
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Figure 6. Yamal LNG facilities, including principle Russian and international companies.233  
 
 Thus far, this thesis has presented China’s evolution as a “Near Arctic State” 
through examination of the Arctic’s existing governance structures and case studies. In 
the process, several themes have emerged, which are again reflected in the NSR’s 
geopolitical environment. These include theories that exclusive state practices lead to less 
controllable, peripheral results; the changing definition of Arctic governance from one of 
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littoral sovereignty to a knowledge and commercial-based structure; commentary on 
China’s norm-engineering of a “peaceful rise;” and the important role political 
anthropology plays in Arctic affairs. The NSR is unlike Greenland, where China has thus 
far avoided direct state-to-state confrontation with established Arctic powers, while 
opportunistically promoting infrastructure and mining projects, tailored to the island’s 
independence movement. It is also not quite analogous to China's Nordic partnerships, 
particularly in Iceland and Norway, where China has developed key infrastructure and 
promoted science-diplomacy forums external to the AC. Instead, the NSR represents a 
complicated, yet progressing relationship between two major powers, Russia and China, 
derived from shared concerns over Western power imbalance, desires for technology and 
energy exchange, and joint-understanding of changing global needs. It is a culturally 
symbolic region, particularly for Russia, providing the context and impetus for a 
significant amount of its domestic and foreign policy agendas. Since 2014, Russia has 
increasingly looked to its evolving cooperation with China, as well as other Asian states, 
to achieve many of its regional goals.234 China, also looking to strategically court Russia, 
has risen to the occasion, incorporating its BRI policy into equivalent Russian national 
programs. In addition, it has grown scientific-commercial forums, participated in military 
exercises, improved technology and information exchanges, demonstrated infrastructure 
building prowess, promoted the promises of NSR shipping and energy, and begun to 
pursue cooperative stakes within potentially evolving international legal definitions. Each 
of these avenues represent movement towards achievement of a legitimate stake in Arctic 
governance. Taken collectively, China cannot be regarded as simply a national or 
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regional investor, but rather as an agent of a changing peripheral governance paradigm. 
This extends beyond Sino-Russian or even Arctic regional affairs, but towards larger 
concepts of global governance as well, as discussed in a 2017 article by Xu Hong of the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he expounds on the “global-regional-
national” nature of Chinese Arctic engagement.235 This chapter argues it is in the NSR 
region where China has truly arrived as an Arctic power, and where its Arctic 
motivations will also increasingly interact with larger geopolitical movements. 
 We will first examine the recent wealth of literature on Sino-Russian cooperation 
in the NSR. From this background, we transition into a study of political anthropology, 
the cultural and historically based context guiding both states’ contemporary activities. 
Much of China’s motivations for Arctic expansion have been explored in Chapters 1 and 
2, but this section seeks to explain its particular incentive for establishing a foothold in 
the NSR and compares these to Russia’s own motivations. Russia’s political 
anthropology, untouched in earlier portions of the thesis, will be covered in more detail. 
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a cataloguing of the Sino-Russian NSR 
relationship, organized from the strategic to a more operational perspective. In addition to 
illustrating the significance of the NSR to China’s greater Arctic ambitions, this section 
furthers theories on the methods for peripheral governance in relation to exclusion and 
norm entrepreneurship. The chapter ends with an analogy to the 19th century British 
“World System,”236 where the realities of maritime-driven economic power were much 
more complicated than the common perception of “British Empire” implies. Though not 
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a perfect reflection of the contemporary NSR dynamic, an examination of 19th century 
Chinese treaty ports reflect similarities and furthers political anthropological context. 
 Existing literature on NSR development commonly falls into one of four 
categories: how the NSR fits into larger theories on Arctic cooperative and strategic 
policy, the cultural and political perspectives of Russian and China on NSR region 
expansion, legal interpretations on the region’s jurisdiction, and sector-specific analyses 
driven by the shipping community. A large portion of recent scholarship published 
through accredited polar-specific academic journals enjoy funding from Russian or 
Chinese universities. This does not refute theses articles’ findings, and serves to again 
highlight the synthesis of each states’ official policy and academia; however, it is still 
noteworthy.  
 Overviews of Arctic cooperation and strategic competition assist in placing the 
NSR within larger Arctic themes. Of these, Michael Byers and Jørgen Staun offer the 
best commentary on liberal IR theory towards Arctic governance. Byers’ assertion that 
the polar regions as well as space create human environments of  “complex and resilient 
interdependence” can certainly be argued in the NSR context, given Russia’s growing 
embrace of foreign partners to overcome regional challenges.237 While Staun ultimately 
takes a more pessimistic view than Byers on the enduring strength of Arctic cooperative 
behavior, he too posits that a combination of institutionalized liberalism within Russia’s 
Arctic-focused diplomatic bureaucracy and commercial interests close to the Kremlin 
will likely continue to overcome its more realist forces.238 Like Staun, Mariia Kobzeva 
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uses a defensive neorealist approach, arguing that despite deeper, cultural unease with its 
budding Chinese relationship, both nations stand to gain by furthering the Arctic’s status 
quo of cooperative behavior.239 Kobzeva combines Staun and Byers’s points on the 
potential threats posed to this order, indicating U.S. militarism could further strengthen 
Sino-Russian security partnership into a “NSR club.”240 This latter point will be covered 
shortly and is supported by increasing military engagement between the two states. 
Anchoring her arguments on the classic seapower theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, 
Margaret Blunden rounds out the current regional strategic analyses of Byers, Staun, and 
Kobzeva, adding predictive scenarios on Arctic state alignments. Quoting China’s Dalian 
Maritime University’s Li Zhenfu in his statement, “whoever has control over the Arctic 
route will control the new passage of world economics and international strategies,” 
Blunden introduces the possibility of a “Northern Pearls” commercial-military buildup 
akin to China’s Indian Ocean expansion.241 
 Supporting this thesis's sub-theme on the close association between culture and 
national policy are several scholars who remark on the NSR’s significance to each state. 
Bertelsen and Gallucci, Daria Gritsenko, and Rafael Luna illustrate the historic political 
significance of Russian Arctic development and compare its emotional motivations to 
China’s more rational, global ambitions.242 From this foundation, scholarship follows two 
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paths: one predicting ever greater Sino-Russian cooperative structures and another that 
highlights potential rifts in the relationship, which could erode their future ties.243 
Ongoing NSR development has also led to significant legal examination of the 
waterway’s proper jurisdiction amidst Sino-Russo collaboration. This is particularly 
significant to our theme of exclusive versus inclusive state and regional behavior, as 
international laws inherently introduces a global dynamic to what are otherwise areas of 
nation-state control and deliberation. On one side of the legal divide are those petitioning 
Russia to follow an internationalized interpretation on freedom of navigation through the 
NSR, supported by UNCLOS.244 On the other side, are arguments supporting Russia’s 
preferred nationalized approach.245 A final group explore China’s larger global strategy at 
play in tacit acceptance of unilateral Russian governance, both to support its own claims 
in the East and South China Seas and assist in unhindered Arctic resource access.246 
The final category of interest in NSR development comes from what Yiru Zhang, 
Qiang Meng, and Liye Zhang call an already “well-rounded” amount of literature on the 
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NSR’s shipping feasibility.247 Cumulatively, these studies combine discussion comparing 
NSR shipping time and costs with established southern ocean routes, and the physical, 
logistical, infrastructure and legal challenges posed to companies attempting to operate in 
the high north.248 Others comment on the adverse impacts of Crimea sanctions to the 
number of vessels annually transiting the NSR and offer suggestions for improving its 
productivity.249 Finally, Sergey Sevastyanov and Aleksey Kravchuk provide a bridge 
back to Byers’s argument on “complex interdependence,” stating Arctic shipping 
represents one of the most tangible aspects of this ongoing regional cooperative 
behavior.250 
Overall, literature on Sino-Russian activity in the NSR is robust and covers a 
variety of assessments expected for a developing region of international influence. 
Though a majority of these previous works already compare Russia and China’s 
motivations for the NSR, this thesis argues few existing studies take a more holistic 
approach towards assessing China’s greater advancement of its “Near Arctic” statehood. 
That is, examining all of China’s recent forays into Arctic influence to determine where it 
has most closely achieved its expressed policy goals. This chapter specifically argues 
NSR development represents the first clear indication China has arrived as a permanent 
Arctic presence in line with its overarching regional strategy. While still “advancing 
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incrementally”251 and peacefully, it is in the NSR that China has gained acceptance as a 
necessary asset for large-scale and collaborative Arctic enterprise. As a result, it has 
established multiple avenues for attaining a major role in Arctic governance outside the 
framework of existing IOs. This chapter also builds on a political anthropology approach 
to addressing respective Russian and Chinese state actions. Finally, while Blunden 
bolsters her argument with Mahanian seapower theory, few other Arctic scholars support 
their arguments with historical case studies on rising maritime economies. This chapter 
offers a unique comparison to aspects of the 19th century British “World System,”252 
drawing an analogy between Great Britain’s coastal Chinese treaty ports and China’s own 
contemporary BRI interests for the NSR. 
Political Anthropology: Origins of Russian and Chinese Motivation for NSR 
Development 
 
 Russian and Chinese motivations for expanding the NSR are built on respective 
political anthropology. In this context, the definition of political anthropology is well 
represented by Donald Kurtz’s theory of an “orientation” to formal state actions through 
acceptance that “the government of a political community might exist in other 
nonpolitical institutions.”253 In other words, state actions are governed by their societies’ 
symbolic interpretations, history, and diverse interests that nonetheless serve to guide 
political policy. This section seeks to first demonstrate the cultural and historical context 
for Russia and China’s contemporary interaction. From this foundation, the intention is 
for the reader to better appreciate the significant deviation from Russian cultural 
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precedence occurring in the far north and to establish a new perspective on the underlying 
reasons behind related geopolitical events. Russia and China’s evolving partnership 
comes about despite rifts in respective ideology towards the Arctic. How this cooperative 
enterprise has emerged, and how each party views the relationship’s desired outcomes, 
illustrates just how far China has come in achieving formal recognition as an Arctic 
power. Underlying differences may also assist in predicting future interaction. 
Modern Russian Arctic re-development policies are closely tied to achievement of 
velikoderzhavnost, the state of being a great power.254 Similarly to the West’s connection 
between historic Arctic exploration and modern territorial sovereignty,255 and China’s 
attempts to do the same in its 2018 Arctic Policy, Russia’s Arctic conscience has its roots 
in 18th and 19th century expeditions and settlement.256 Russia's contemporary NSR 
revitalization efforts, and desired return to world hegemony, are directly linked to the 
Arctic’s perceived role in sustaining the Soviet Union’s industrial might. During the 
height of the Soviet-era, Russia developed a string of northern, largely isolated industrial 
cities, linked together by the NSR. From a maritime perspective, this created a robust 
domestic transport system that reached 6.58 million tons and over 1,300 vessel transits in 
1987, before rapidly falling with the demise of the Soviet Union.257 In addition to the 
practical significance of state-revenue generated by this volume of shipping and raw 
production, the Soviet Arctic came to represent a symbol of national pride in overcoming 
the challenges of nature, and was considered a space where “true socialism” could 
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flourish.258 In contrast, the post-Soviet demise of many of these once vibrant Arctic cities 
became a source of national shame, and a stirring symbol for the need to revive the 
region. 
From an existential perspective, development of Russia’s far-reaching and 
lucrative territories also meets what Bertelsen and Gallucci describe as Russia’s 
“geostrategic instinct..to maximize imperial space.”259 This concept is tied in closely with 
the Sino-Russo relationship’s irony: Russia’s long desire for territorial exclusivity based 
on a distrust of outsiders and use of strategic resources by Russian central government-
led industry.260 Russia’s border lands have historically posed its greatest external threat, 
creating an anxiety mitigated by the establishment of control over “time and space.”261 
Providing for large sacrifices of territory during invasion ultimately granted Russia 
salvation, exemplified by Napoleon’s ill-fated Grande Armée and Hitler’s 1941 
Operation Barbarossa. Given these pyrrhic victories, Western advance still weighs 
heavily in Russia’s modern strategy as it views what it considers as U.S. and NATO 
encroachment. On its Pacific flank, Russia suffered a devastating loss in the 1904-1905 
Russo-Japanese war, multinational (including Chinese) Siberian occupation during its 
1917 civil war, the 1929 Sino-Soviet War over railroad infrastructure, and further border 
conflicts with China reaching into the 1960s. These events also set a baseline for mistrust 
of Asian power imbalance.262  
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Russia’s historical and cultural perspectives coalesce in its contemporary Arctic 
policies and official rhetoric. Across the Russian political, academic, defense, and public 
spheres is a predominant desire to be considered a great power, facilitated by its Arctic 
territory’s energy and logistical resources.263 However, Russia’s actual approach to 
obtaining a viable NSR region demonstrates competing internal ideologies. This 
dichotomy can even be observed in the rhetoric of Russian leaders, with President Putin’s 
2010 call for cooperation, “If you stand alone, you can’t survive in the Arctic. Nature 
makes people and states to help each other,” on one hand, and the more romanticized, 
nationalist statement of former Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, “The Arctic is a 
Russian Mecca.”264 President Putin presides over the policy realization of both versions, 
or what Staun refers to in IR theory as a liberal and realist “discourse” and Sergunin and 
Gjørv as “soft” and “hard” approaches to Arctic policy.265 The former are primarily 
composed of advocates of commerce and scientific advancement and the latter of Russia 
security-minded proponents. Staun goes as far as to offer a qualitative list of common 
Russian Arctic parlance, with words like ‘conquest’, ‘exploring’, ‘Russia’s greatness’, 
‘revival’ and ‘sovereignty” arising from Russia’s realist camp and ‘joint-venture’, 
‘public–private partnerships’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘productive cooperation’ appearing from 
its liberal-minded demographic.266 Russia’s two philosophical camps are also observed in 
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its decision to annex Crimea in 2014, its 2007 flag planting on the seafloor of the North 
Pole, yet its display of cooperation within multilateral Arctic forums.267 
For China, a climate-altered Arctic represents important new spheres of influence, 
energy and trade markets, Arctic development experience, and international status 
fulfillment. However, the degree of dependency placed on this single region to fulfill 
larger societal objectives is arguably much lower than in Russia. On the historical front, 
China has a shorter Arctic presence, though it still sought to document its past 
participation in early Arctic treaties and recent scientific expeditions in its 2018 Arctic 
Policy.268 The Arctic therefore lacks the emotive pull inspired by Soviet-era propaganda, 
or contemporary political references to a once gloried northern past. China instead frames 
its Arctic and NSR-regional development motivations on more logic-based criteria, 
where its Arctic progress is considered just one of numerous avenues in fulfilling larger 
global ambitions.269 One of its main catalysts for global expansion, including to the NSR 
region, is a requirement for continued access to diverse energy sources. Energy access 
fulfills not only essential consumer and industry needs, but also comes with pressure to 
satisfy domestic desire for cleaner fuels, stemming from the widely acknowledged 
negative consequences of China’s rapid economic rise built heavily upon coal use.270 In 
at least one respect, it shares a security-minded perspective with Russia. As a nation that 
has defined its economic rise by virtue of international shipping and whose continued 
growth is dependent on persistent access to global energy sources, its “border” concerns 
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are devoted to the maintenance of strategic sea lanes of communication, especially 
through the East-West maritime chokepoints of the Malacca Strait and Suez Canal.271 
The NSR offers another, potentially faster East-West corridor for energy supply should 
the security of existing passages be compromised. 
Those more cynical of China’s overall global intentions describe its Arctic 
activities as yet another example of its modern application of 反客为主 (to make the host 
and the guest exchange roles), an ancient proverb reflecting this thesis’s exclusion-
peripheralization theory and its earlier discussion of the arguments of realists scholars 
like Anne-Marie Brady, Mia Bennett, and Camilia Sorenson.272 For example, in her book 
China as a Polar Great Power, Brady describes a 2009-era legacy version of China’s 
eventual 2018 Arctic Policy, published by the China Oceanic Administration for a 
Chinese audience, in which the organization’s deputy director detailed a three-step plan 
to obtain Arctic influence. This included a gradual rise via a science-diplomatic angle to a 
position in “hard power” Arctic governance, which Brady claims is already occurring.273 
In the context of the Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, concern over China’s deeper 
or more nuanced intentions frequently arises. As will be discussed shortly, despite 
growing security ties, Russia is still wary of oversharing territory, strategic infrastructure, 
and information as well as China’s potential designs on dual-use technology.274 Others 
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point to China’s potential manipulation of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO)’s Polar Code, or the use of remote sensing capabilities to influence UNCLOS 
provisions that might reverse the “guest-owner” dynamic. Despite these potential 
political anthropological challenges, the remaining sections of this chapter will provide 
evidence to the growing realization of China’s Arctic, and perhaps more global goals, via 
the NSR. 
The NSR and China’s Arctic Arrival 
 Given Russia’s exclusive national character and the cultural significance it places 
on the NSR region, its embrace of China (as well as other rising Asian powers and 
Norway) as investors, maritime security partners, science advisors, and infrastructure 
developers demonstrates just how far Arctic power dynamics have shifted. Joint NSR re-
development projects, while not replete of obstacles, offer China its largest and most 
lucrative Arctic foothold to date, positioning it to affect change in Eurasian and Arctic 
governance. This new norm of Chinese Arctic competence, constructed outside 
traditional regional organizations, is the result of focused years-long efforts placed on 
bilateral resume building. Admittedly, Russia’s “Asian pivot”275 was further catalyzed by 
a desperate need for financial assistance following Western sanctions imposed after the 
annexation of Crimea. However, China’s status as its preferred partner is at least two 
decades in the making, arising from mutually desired resistance to perceived U.S. power 
imbalance, energy and technology trade, and tacit acceptance of respective domestic 
policies long criticized by the West.276 This section catalogues each of these efforts and 
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opportunities, emphasizing it is in the NSR region where China has already realized its 
Arctic goals. 
 Recent strategic-level agreements between Russia and China have synchronized 
each nation’s principle expansion programs, linking the Eurasian Economic Union, 
China’s BRI, and several NSR development projects. The combination of these efforts 
provide an unprecedented Arctic gateway for China, while simultaneously satisfying 
Russia’s investment needs. In July 2017, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin signed 
the China-Russia Joint Declaration on Further Strengthening Comprehensive, Strategic 
and Cooperative Partnership.277 This pact was expanded in June 2019 with the Joint 
Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the 
Development of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Collaboration in the New 
Era. Both documents detail Sino-Russian plans to co-develop the Arctic.278 The 2019 
Joint Statement describes each states’ intention, “to promote Sino-Russian cooperation in 
the sustainable development of the Arctic, expand the development and use of Arctic 
waterways and cooperation in the areas of infrastructure, resource development, tourism, 
ecology and environmental protection in the Arctic region on the basis of the rights and 
interests of coastal States. Support the continuation of polar scientific cooperation and 
promote the implementation of joint Arctic scientific research cruises and joint Arctic 
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research projects. Continuation[sic] of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the International 
Arctic Forum “Arctic-Dialogue Region.”279  
 The 2019 statement is significant to Chinese Arctic expansion in several respects. 
First, it represents a major achievement in integrating its own external goals into Russia’s 
through commerce-focused common policies.280 Second, it displays two traditional Arctic 
ideologies in which China benefits: regional cooperation and exploitation. While ecology 
and environment are mentioned, a science premise is frequently applied to Arctic matters 
involving commercial development. Lobbying for “infrastructure, resource development, 
[and] tourism” falls within Chinese policy recommendations for gaining access to future 
governance systems.281 The statement’s notable mention of the rights of coastal states 
highlights China’s consistent public acknowledgment for its respect of regional 
sovereignty and its simultaneous methods for gaining influence outside of those 
traditional boundaries. Third, while this statement subtly reflects the Russian 
anthropological fear of outside territorial incursion, it appears designed to mitigate —
likely domestic concerns— by listing the multiple advantages of foreign cooperation. 
Finally, China’s participation in the Territory of Dialogue, International Arctic Forum is 
perhaps the most visible example of the close association between Chinese and Russian 
industry interests and national policies. The Russian government website for its 6th 
annual gathering, planned for 2021 in St Petersburg, combines these motivations on its 
home page. Industry partners are prominently listed (Gazprom, Novatek, Nornickel, and 
                                                 
279 “Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Development of a 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Collaboration in the New Era (full text),” Xinhua, June 6, 2019, 
https://www.bilaterals.org/?joint-statement-of-the-people-s.  
280 Brady, China As a Polar Great Power, 227. 
281 Brady, China As a Polar Great Power, 227. 
 
 102 
Rosatom). A stylish Arctic visual features the promises of hydrocarbon, acknowledgment 
of the region’s diverse array of flora and fauna, and depicts numerous environmental 
research stations. The page also features a cameo of President Vladimir Putin next to a 
statement in which he implores that the forum, “unite[s] expert and research 
communities…politicians and businesspeople from different countries – those who…are 
involved in the important work of promoting the harmonious development of the Arctic 
and the preservation of its unique nature and the distinctive cultural traditions of the local 
peoples.”282 Of note, China sent the second largest number of delegates to the Dialogue’s 
2019 conference, just behind Norway in an international field that included 
representatives from 52 nations.283 While Chapter 1’s discussion of epistemic 
communities focused primarily on growing importance of scientific knowledge networks, 
according to Rasmus Bertelsen, the cooperation between commercial and scientific 
stakeholders with these forums also represent similar communities of action and 
behavioral “diffusion.” Such multi-disciplinary interactions impart parties with 
understanding of both their sector’s motives and their representative roles for respective 
state policies.284 
 Sino-Russian maritime security cooperation has also grown significantly over the 
last two decades and is anticipated to soon reach the Arctic via the NSR. According to 
Mariia Kobzeva, both states’ adversarial relationships with U.S. military global presence, 
and U.S. trade tensions with China since 2016, have increased a mutual desire to balance 
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Eurasian power.285 This aspect of Sino-Russian partnership has most visibly manifested 
itself in a growing number of joint military exercises including eight of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO)’s annual Joint Sea naval serials, three SCO-sponsored 
multi-disciplinary drills including the bilateral Peace Mission, and the 2018 Chinese 
participation in Russia’s quadrennial Vostok.286 One unnamed 2016 naval exercise off 
Kamchatcka occurred without prior U.S. knowledge, due to poor satellite coverage of 
certain Arctic areas.287 These exercises foreshadowed the June 2017 signing of a Sino-
Russian “Military Cooperation Roadmap 2017-2020” and the October 2019 
announcement of a joint collaboration for ballistic missile defense, which once 
operational, would inherently involve Arctic region monitoring, given U.S. ballistic 
missile trajectories.288 Although left unsaid in official announcements, melting ice across 
the NSR poses both a challenge and yet another potential future engagement platform in 
the form of intelligence-surveillance-and reconnaissance (ISR) sharing. Further military 
alliance building or even a mutual defense treaty, are very likely contingent on Russia’s 
internal negotiation of its residual fear over Asian power imbalances.289 This includes 
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concerns on dual-use naval infrastructure or weather monitoring systems that could be 
converted into surveillance platforms. In the short term, in is more likely the relationship 
will continue along its current exercise and technical sharing trajectory. 
 Even before its 2018 Arctic policy release, China actively promoted itself as a 
leader in the effort to grow Arctic “wisdom,” through numerous state-sponsored scientific 
expeditions.290 NSR development furthers this Arctic scientific leadership agenda, 
advances China’s international status, and in doing so puts it in position for greater Arctic 
influence. Several joint university projects exemplify this aspect of NSR cooperation. 
These include the China-Russia Arctic Research Center between the Qingdao-based 
National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology and Moscow-based Shirshov 
Institute of Oceanology focused on using ice density studies to better predict seasonal 
navigability of the strait, and the Harbin Engineering University-Northern Federal 
University sponsored Russia-China Arctic Research Consortium that takes an economic 
approach to improving NSR management and technology sharing.291 As in nearly all 
Chinese “science-diplomacy” forums, the premise behind both projects bridges 
environmental research with an underlying commercial motive. 
 Related to science, commerce, and security efforts are more tailored NSR 
partnerships requiring technological coordination in the areas of shipping, ship 
construction, engineering, and remote sensing.292 These activities are further linked to the 
prevailing Arctic legal regimes, including UNCLOS and the IMO Polar Code. Chinese 
various sector expertise is supported by Russia’s 2013 Arctic Strategy, which points to 
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international technological cooperation as the means to achieving its NSR goals.293 
Shipping is considered China’s most advantageous industry in terms of economic and 
future political influence, although it is not the only international actor involved in NSR 
transit.294 The NSR is a challenging maritime environment from both a logistics and 
environmental standpoint. Although on paper, it dramatically decreases the shipping time 
between northern European and northeastern Asian city-pairs, its draft limitations, 
crumbling Soviet-era port facilities, lack of search and rescue (SAR) or other marine 
shipping disaster response infrastructure, related insurance premiums, and seasonally 
arduous conditions cut down on the current numbers of international vessels able to 
routinely use the waterway.295 Additionally, Russian desire to nationalize the strait using 
its interpretation of UNCLOS Arctic 234 on traditionally ice-covered areas, has stirred 
concerns of additional shipping costs, perhaps in the form of icebreaker, pilotage, or other 
unique service fees.296  
 Despite, or perhaps as a reaction to these obstacles, China’s economic and status 
gain vis-à-vis the NSR should not be in question. Russia’s prioritization of NSR 
development at the highest levels of government and government-tied industry, creates a 
constant Chinese commercial advantage. In March 2018, President Putin set an official 
expectation that the NSR would host the transit of 80 million tons of cargo by 2025.297 
Thus far, this goal has been troublesome to reach, with small domestic vessels still 
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accounting for the majority of 2019’s 26 million tons of cargo. However, Russia has 
every incentive to encourage increased Chinese and other extra-regional state use, 
especially for LNG shipping out of the Yamal Peninsula. An improvement was observed 
in a 29.5% increase in international shipping between 2018-2019, and a 17% growth thus 
far in 2020 including a slight rise in eastward-destined vessels.298 After ten years of 
growing its Arctic shipping competency, notably initiated through a training agreement 
with Russian shipping company Sovcomflot, China has yet to realize its own 2020 goal 
of using the NSR for 15% of all of its shipping.299 However, China has benefited from an 
additional comprehensive 2019 partnership between its primary carrier COSCO, 
Sovcomflot, and Novatek that launched the Marine Arctic Transport LLC. The 
company’s business plan is to invest in logistics designed to improve movement of 
Russian fossil fuels to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) states and enhance 
overall Asian-European trade.300 This places China in a position to influence not only 
NSR commerce, but trade relations between the East and West, a key tenet of the BRI. 
Even with the NSR’s challenges, Brady cites the writings of Chinese Arctic-focused 
policy scholars, Guo Peiqing and Li Zhenfu, who urge state-owned corporations to 
increase use of Arctic shipping routes in order to “enhance [China’s] national Arctic 
legitimacy.”301 Arctic legitimacy in this context representing an ability to sway regional 
policy towards Chinese interests. 
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 China’s expertise in ship construction and infrastructure development are also 
especially relevant to the NSR in the production of ice-capable vessels and port facilities. 
In both areas, Russia has again turned to China for assistance, using China Shipbuilding 
and Offshore International and Qingdao Beihai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry for 
construction of portions of its new ice-breaker shipyard, Zvezda, in 2016. South Korean 
companies have played a significant part in construction of Zvezda, but coordination 
appears to go directly through Russia rather than jointly with China.302 As of 2019, 
Chinese companies invested over $20 billion into 80 Russian port development projects, 
with state companies expected to be heavily involved in the critical expansion of deep-
water port facilities in Kamchatka.303 Kamchatka is particularly relevant to a Russian 
shipping scheme to construct LNG transport facilities on either end of the NSR (the other 
facilities planned for Murmansk, Russia and Rostock, Germany), which would be used to 
transfer fuel from smaller NSR regional, ice-capable ships to larger international cargo 
vessels.304 Given the intimate relationship between Russian business and central 
government, and China’s own SOE, these trade developments represents another 
peripheral Arctic governance prospect brought about by the NSR.  
 It must be noted that the Yamal LNG and NSR related energy related projects 
remain the most successful Sino-Russian joint endeavors to date. In their study, “Chinese 
Infrastructure Diplomacy in Russia: the Geopolitics of Project Type, Location, and 
Scale,” Jia Fanqi and Mia Bennett determined that residual Russian distrust of China on 
its borders is subtly demonstrated by the success of energy related and interior 
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infrastructure projects as compared to joint infrastructure and transport system 
construction along border areas. In addition to Yamal LNG, successful energy or mineral 
projects listed in their report include the Eastern Siberian-Pacific Ocean pipeline, Power 
of Siberia (PoS) natural gas pipeline, and an iron-ore rail line originating from Kimkano-
Sutarsky. Other non-energy based, cross-border projects have been met with hurdles.305 
 China’s role in using its Arctic “wisdom” to sidestep traditional territorial-based 
governance regimes reaches a critical junction when considering international ocean and 
shipping regulations. Specifically, legal scholars contend that the IMO's Polar Code and 
UNCLOS could be used by China to affect future Arctic governance. The Polar Code’s 
operational framework avoids territorial jargon, inherently globalizing its regulations 
outside of established territory, much to China’s advantage.306 China was notably a 
passive participant during international deliberations on the law, submitting proposals to 
the IMO that sought to lessen the code’s environmental and shipbuilding requirements 
after its 2014 deadline had past.307 However, as Chinese ships transiting the NSR increase 
in number, China’s dual roles as the world’s leading merchant ship operator and builder 
—and thus one of the Polar Code’s most prolific future constituents — have led some 
scholars to postulate that China could yet affect the law in its actual practice. This 
concept is sometimes referred to as “technopolitics,” whereby the leaders in a specific 
technological sector are considered more influential than the states or regions in which 
that industry operates.308 This thesis contends that while operational exercise of the Polar 
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Code may result in its gradual evolution, there remains enough influence within the 
global shipping community irrespective of China —especially in northern European 
shipping powers like Norway—and territorial state influence to counter any significant 
deviation from established international law. Furthermore, the Arctic’s commercial-
science based epistemic communities, sourced from stable, long-term adherents of liberal 
institutionalism likely serve as effective counterweights to any radical shifts. However, 
movements towards further globalization of Arctic governance systems are also 
embraced by a number of scientific and commercial stakeholders, and China’s continued 
involvement in these related Arctic forums place it in an advantageous position to shape 
any gradual changes to currently accepted institutional norms. 
 The use of UNCLOS to support individual state agendas is slightly more nuanced 
than the above Polar Code discussion, and may be even less likely to change with an 
increased Chinese Arctic presence. Russia uses UNCLOS to justify its territorial rights to 
the NSR, highlighting its cultural preference for exclusion. Yet, it is faced with a 
simultaneous desire to improve the NSR’s global commercial use. While China quietly 
joins with other international states in claiming the NSR as an international straight 
subject to freedom of navigation protections, it has no current incentive to actively protest 
Russia’s position.309 In fact, given its own contested territorial claims in the East China 
and South China Seas, China has equal incentive for respecting Russia’s national claim 
on the NSR.310 Tying back to Arctic-related IR theory, the current NSR regime of de 
facto Russian control supports defensive realists’ argument that maintenance of the status 
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quo is preferred. Given that as Farré et al. posit, “commercial shipping and sustainable 
economic growth require a supportive, stable, and predictable governance system,”311 this 
thesis argues China will prioritize its advantageous NSR access and will not contest 
Russian regulations. 
 Russia’s claims to the seabed adjoining the NSR offer a final means for potential 
Chinese involvement in international Arctic deliberation. In 2001 and 2015, Russia 
submitted seabed claims to the CLCS for the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges. If 
approved, this would extend its economic exclusion zone (EEZ) to encompass 1.2 million 
square kilometers of the Arctic’s seafloor.312 The area of Russia’s submission 
encompasses portions of Denmark and Canada’s own claims. A CLCS decision will thus 
require significant arbitration, potentially necessitating additional scientific data to 
support individual state territories. Arctic seabed claims require state-of-the-art 
technology to access and map ice-covered areas of the Arctic Ocean. As of 2020, the 
multinational Seabed 2030 Project estimated that only 20% of the Arctic has been 
mapped, an increase since its 7% estimate in 2012.313 A lack of detailed charts throughout 
the Arctic, including within territorial waters, has repercussions across the spectrum of 
Arctic motivations including climate science, resource exploitation, and shipping. 
China’s significant investment in polar science, including remote sensing technologies, 
make it a viable participant in the future politics of seabed arbitration. It is possible 
Russia and China could also collaborate on underwater fiber optic cable emplacement 
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and deep seabed mining activities. Both of these activities have larger repercussions for 
China’s BRI, and international deliberation on controversial seabed operations. 
Historical Case Study: Great Britain’s 19th Century Treaty Port System 
 Creating historical analogies that fit perfectly within contemporary contexts can 
be a perilous undertaking. A significant list of similarities exist between Great Britain’s 
creation of a “treaty port” mercantile system in China, and China’s own modern Arctic 
ambitions; however, differences remain and the comparative history is deserving of 
further study. The principle distinction is that while mid 19th century China was coerced 
into ceding portions of several of its coastal cities to Western powers in the Treaty of 
Nanking at the conclusion of the Opium Wars, modern Russia is in a far less vulnerable a 
position. In terms of coercive practice alone, one might find a better historical match in 
China’s development of port infrastructure in Hambantota, Sri Lanka.314 Nonetheless, 
China’s 21st century BRI-related projects in the NSR do mirror similar practices at work 
in the 19th century. Furthermore, there are compelling links one can draw from China’s 
own experience as a subject of the treaty port system, and its 21st century imposition of a 
version of this commercial structure on other states.315 Much more could be written 
comparing the 19th and 21st century globalization practices of emerging and established 
great powers, or how contemporary great power aspirants model their own history. 
Therefore, this section represents only a brief synopsis of identified parallels between 
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Britain’s treaty port system and China’s own investment and technology-based approach 
to future NSR and Arctic governance.  
 China’s BRI, and its Arctic extension, the Polar Silk Road, officially seeks to 
advantage China’s global position through improved trade, communication, and related 
infrastructure development. This concept closely resembles what John Darwin states in 
his general description of the 19th century British System as an intention to “promote the 
integration of these widely separated places: commercially, strategically, 
politically…diffusing British beliefs and ideas – culturally as well.”316 As discussed 
above, modern China is pursuing a foothold in each in the form of joint state-industry 
commercial projects like Yamal LNG, security-related engagements, and strategic-level 
joint policy statements and agreements. Even in external foreign power-wary Russia, it is 
inevitable that elements of Chinese culture, especially business practices, are also shared 
in the process through aforementioned knowledge sharing networks.  
 Much like China’s contemporary entreaties, 19th century Britain relied on 
technological advances, new commercial partnerships, infrastructure development, and 
advantageous legal interpretations. Britain’s mastery of the latest technology, like the 
telegraph and undersea communications cables, was essential to linking its distant 
commercial territories back to London’s commercial center.317 This “cognitive territory” 
extended as well to the social and physical sciences, which were used as political tools to 
favorably influence Britain’s standing over its subject states.318 Similar to our study on 
Russian and Chinese state-run industry and their influence on “soft” Arctic strategy, 19th 
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century Britain sought to establish unique new commercial arrangements within its treaty 
ports. This was most apparent in the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, which though 
officially operated by China’s Foreign Service, was in reality a British orchestrated effort 
to advantage Western-bound trade through tariffs controls.319 Involved in this new treaty 
port organization were domestically-sourced middlemen who provided a necessary link 
between Britain’s commercial interests and 19th century China’s regional and central 
government.320 One could argue Russia’s energy industry oligarchs function in much the 
same way, leveraging commercial relationships with their Chinese counterparts to effect 
Kremlin policy. 
 Shipping and infrastructure —and their ties to law — were essential to the 19th 
century treaty port system and Britain’s creation of a “commercial republic” rather than a 
territory-based empire.321 Robert Bickers notes the relationship between the construction 
of “seemingly mundane harbours, jetties, and warehouses” in treaty ports and British 
achievement of global commercial hegemony. This created a lucrative environment for 
Britain, while simultaneously providing China with needed infrastructure developments. 
Bickers states, “the complexities of infrastructural developments, and thereby of 
processes of globalization…could serve the needs and strategic objectives of both 
colonial powers and of states resisting colonial power, and that while they served local 
and national purposes they also formed part of an increasingly global infrastructure.”322 It 
                                                 
319 Wolfgang Keller, Ben Li, and Carol H. Shiue,“ Shanghai’s Trade, China’s Growth: Continuity, 
Recovery, and Change since the Opium Wars,” IMF Economic Review 61, no. 2 (2013): 342, 
https://doi:10.3386/w17754. 
320 Kaori Abe, “Intermediary Elites in the Treaty Port World: Tong Mow-Chee and His Collaborators in 
Shanghai, 1873-1897,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 25, no. 3 (07, 2015): 462,  
https://doi:10.1017/S1356186315000139. 
321 Darwin, The Empire Project, 10. 
322 Robert Bickers, “Infrastructural Globalization: Lighting the China Coast, 1860s-1930s,” The Historical 
Journal 56, no. 2 (June, 2013): 455, https://doi:10.1017/S0018246X13000010. 
 
 114 
could be argued the contemporary Russian need for external development assistance has 
creates a very similar circumstance. Like our discussion on the potential use of the IMO 
Polar Code and UNCLOS to gradually increase influence over future Arctic governance, 
British shipping companies also used their commercial weight to affect the outcomes of 
laws pertaining to treaty ports, including the Treaty of Nanking. This “right of 
extraterritoriality”323 discussed at length by Jeremy Taylor, finds contemporary relevancy 
in modern Arctic-related legal statues that benefit non-regional states like China. 
 Finally, as Blunden’s recalling of Mahanian seapower theory describes, there is 
an enduring causal relation between merchant and naval interests. Although modern 
Sino-Russian security ties are still in development and Russia remains wary of expanding 
Chinese military power, an increasingly greater merchant footprint in the NSR evokes 
Mahan’s historical exhortation that “armed shipping must follow the peaceful vessels of 
commerce.”324 Russia would almost certainly not accept a permanent or otherwise 
unfettered Chinese naval presence in its waters. However, the mere presence of future 
Chinese naval vessels in the NSR, following in the path of its own commercial vessels 
would not be insignificant, demonstrating to a global audience China’s growing reach. 
The PLA(N)’s 2015-2016 northern European port calls certainly established a precedence 
for northern sea Chinese presence. This is yet another shared element of the treaty port 
system. While 19th century China forbade Britain from establishing military facilities at 
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its treaty ports, the projection of power made visible by visiting naval ships were 
certainly felt by its population.325  
Analysis: Greater Arctic Themes and the NSR 
 Several Arctic motifs are again present within this study of the NSR. These 
include the growth of knowledge-based systems of influence rather than sovereign 
ownership over Arctic territory. As our study of the 19th century British “World System” 
demonstrated, developing or even established global hegemonies do not always require 
physical territory to exert influence and commercial advantage. Their singular influence 
is rather obtained through “complex governance,” in which technology, communications, 
infrastructure, science, and economy all interact.326 In the NSR, this knowledge territory 
is the result of intensive efforts by Chinese merchant shipping, scientists, and engineers 
to demonstrate China’s Arctic competencies in rather rapid form. This has extended even 
further to include examples of nascent military strategic partnerships that are of 
significant concern to the U.S. 
 State reactions to exclusivity, or rejection from international organizations or 
communities, is another multifaceted theme exemplified in NSR developments. The post 
2014 U.S. led sanctions on Russia can be directly linked to Russia’s need to court new 
partners in Asia, likely an unforeseen or unintended consequence. Russia is likewise 
engaged in exclusivity via its national jurisdiction claims over the NSR and adjoining 
seabed. While it is too early to determine the final direction of these policies, it appears 
that in the near term, China will continue to find it advantageous to ignore its quiet 
opposition to Russia’s claims, provided Russia continues to incentivize its NSR use. 
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Russia’s future reaction to the CLCS’s ruling on the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges 
will be a significant moment in Arctic history. Russian acceptance of the international 
court’s findings, would support scholars and policy makers who have argued that the 
Arctic represents one of the globe’s unique regions that respects institutionalism and 
“complex interdependence.”327 A negative response, guided by adherents to Russia’s 
competing realist political-culture, will have significant adverse effects on the stability of 
Arctic governance. China is positioning itself to benefit from either outcome. 
 Finally, NSR development represents the dramatic change of Arctic related 
foreign policy and interaction from a regional to international scope. The NSR’s role in 
Chinese global strategy, as an alternative transport route should Malacca, Suez, Panama 
and other sea lane of communication chokepoints be comprised is one example. So too is 
the increase of external diplomatic factors, such as the Crimea sanctions and general 
East-West relations that have impacted NSR development. Even the economic effects of 
the 2020 global Covid-19 pandemic have temporarily altered appraisals of NSR energy 
investments and related shipping.328 As climate change increases seasonal access to the 
NSR, additional international stakeholders will continue to emerge. These will include 
shipping companies, infrastructure developers, environmentalists, additional international 
legal scrutiny, and transnational criminal syndicates among others. Development of deep-
water ports on either side of the NSR as proposed for Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatsky will also increase overall international focus on the region’s potential.329 As 
Rasmus Bertelsen writes, “Arctic climate change is an instance of globalization…caused 
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far south in centers of population and economic activity, with amplified effects in the 
Arctic.”330 These effects pose global threats and promise, driving Arctic focus, 
expansion, and attitudes towards governance. 
Conclusion 
 In 2013, when China first formally entered Arctic geopolitics through its 
admission as an AC Observer, conjecture abounded over its intended regional role. 
Literature published in response to China’s 2018 Arctic Policy white paper offered a 
wide spectrum of possibilities. In observing China’s subsequent rise as a “Near Arctic 
State” from a wider lens, one discovers the realties of China’s Arctic role differ 
geographically. A spectrum of influence methodology can be seen in China’s more 
cautious, incremental and admittedly outsider status in its AC Observer position; the 
peripheral growth of epistemic community forums and infrastructure developments with 
individual Nordic states and other actors; and more strategic alignment with Russia over 
the NSR. This chapter argues that of these, the NSR region stands as the first major 
regional project in which China has been named as an essential, multifaceted Arctic 
institution — most notably by Russia, an historically exclusive and distrustful Arctic 
geopolitical actor.  
 Examination of respective Chinese and Russian political-anthropology provides 
essential context to Sino-Russian collaboration over the NSR. Specifically, Russia’s 
historic wariness of foreign powers, especially in regards to its borders and resources, 
adds significant weight to its decision to collaborate with China. While the Sino-Russian 
partnership is not without potential rifts, and certainly advanced more rapidly following 
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the 2014 annexation of Crimea, its development has steadily progressed over the last two 
decades. For China, joint partnership in the NSR provides numerous avenues for 
achieving greater influence in Eurasian and Arctic governance, while expanding new 
energy and shipping access. Most importantly, the collaboration features strategic-level 
agreements that combine the goals of the BRI, China’s principle national development 
policy, with Russia’s equivalent national and regional programs. The NSR also serves as 
a focal point for high-level commercial-science forums, which will likely become 
relevant to already strengthening security engagements. Additionally, NSR operations 
and related dialogues provides permissible environments for China’s furthering of 
“cognitive territory”331 via demonstration of shipping, infrastructure, and polar science 
proficiencies. The latter activities’ potential “techno-political”332 effects on the IMO 
Polar Code and UNCLOS legal regimes, remain unclear. However, given that the laws 
inherently internationalize an otherwise nation-state dominated Arctic governance 
regime, China’s Arctic growing presence will inevitably increase interaction with the 
actual instrumentation of both laws as well as the laws’ other constituents. Yet again, 
China’s thorough involvement in multi-disciplinary knowledge networks, or epistemic 
communities, places it in an advantageous position to effect its desired change. 
Furthermore, China may yet be involved in further joint exploitive activities with Russia, 
should Russia be granted access to its seabed claims. Either way, China will likely 
become one of the laws’ primary extra-regional actors, or possibly a commercial 
beneficiary, following the conclusion of international seabed arbitration. 
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 Many of the activities surrounding China’s role in NSR development have 
historic precedence in Great Britain’s 19th century globalization efforts. The 
establishment of treaty ports along China’s coast in the aftermath of the Opium Wars 
demonstrate that global hegemonies do not always seek central control over territory, but 
rather accept more complex, commercial-based spheres of influence. This case study 
highlighted several parallels to China’s modern intentions and strategy in the NSR 
region. Additionally, the treaty port system identifies a topic for future research regarding 
the link between China’s own subjugation under the treaty port system and political-
anthropological origins for its own 21st century implementation of similar constructs on 
other states. 
  In summary, this chapter once again underlines several ever-present themes in 
modern Arctic geopolitics. These include the emergence of knowledge versus territorial-
based regional influence architecture, consequences for exclusionary practice among 
states, and the ever-globalizing character of the Arctic. Several sub-themes are also 
present when examining the NSR region. Specifically, the effects of political-
anthropology on state policy making, and the seemingly paradoxical yet often integrated 
narratives of the Arctic as a region for exploitation, competition, environmental 
sustainability, and peaceful cooperation. While China and Russia’s realpolitik remains, 









It has been just two years since China released its formal Arctic policy, and seven 
since its acceptance as an AC Observer. As the preceding chapters illuminate, China’s 
Arctic activities are already extensive and complex. Its regional enterprises range from 
growth in academic writing and polar scientific investments, bilateral scientific and 
commercial relationship building with each established Arctic state and epistemic 
communities representing state and non-state interests, and nascent influence in larger 
systems of Arctic governance in parallel with more global-scale administration. China 
has relentlessly pursued all of this on the periphery of established Arctic influence 
structures, despite a short regional history, lack of sovereign territorial holdings, an 
Observer role on the AC, and residual mistrust by some Arctic territorial states. This 
thesis puts forth a theory that exclusion, designed to limit the participation of outsiders in 
international organizations or other multilateral engagement venues in regions 
experiencing rapid globalization, unintentionally creates peripheral influence systems. 
Those states, or aspirational states, excluded from liberal governance regimes will devise 
alternative influence architecture on the ‘borders’ of these systems. In this context, the 
definition of borders becomes vague. Aspects of this theory have been previously defined 
with characterizations such as “flexible regional,”333 “science diplomacy,”334 “cognitive 
territory,”335 or “techno-politics.”336 However, as seen in the Arctic, the process of 
exclusion-peripheralization represents all of these concepts and more.  
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China is not an Arctic monolith as sometimes painted by liberal and realist IR 
theorists. While this thesis leans towards categorizing China’s longterm northern strategy 
in terms of state self-interest, China’s means of attaining a permanent, advantageous 
Arctic role involves more than any one IR theory captures. Portions of its 2018 Arctic 
policy, including China’s open acknowledgement of the existing liberal order, related 
international laws, and national sovereignties are likely transparent. Much of its Arctic 
scientific research, mentioned multiple times in its policy, is driven by a twofold desire to 
be recognized as a global leader in climate science and to protect its own domestic 
interests with respect to climate change. China’s participation in established systems like 
the AC, and the Arctic’s other peripheral forums, does not portend an aggressive 
revisionist strategy. Yet, it would be naive to conclude China does not have larger Arctic 
ambitions that tend towards the realpolitik. As seen in its Greenland and Russian 
entreaties, and more subtly within other regional science diplomacy based agreements, 
China is actively looking for Arctic commercial opportunities and strategic influence 
avenues, often approached in the guise of Arctic advocacy. From a cynical perspective, 
environmental and human security concerns appear to be a popular rhetorical currency 
used in various forums, nominally promoting Arctic issue awareness, yet focusing on 
more exploitive underlying goals. One cannot view China’s culturally-tailored diplomatic 
presence in Greenland for example without comparison to China’s own domestic human 
rights record toward ethnic minorities and political dissidents or its exploitive practices in 
the Indian Ocean and Africa. The same goes for the historical and cultural mistrust 
between Russia and China that is nonetheless taking a backseat to the current economic 
and strategic expediency of developing the NSR region. This thesis began with Fridtjof 
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Nansen’s famous appeal for international cooperation over a subjugated environmental 
space. With climate change forever altering the Arctic’s physical territory, China is 
likewise manipulating international behavior in the region, beyond traditional territorial 
boundaries. The final consequences of China’s ascendancy are not yet clear. However, 
this thesis sought to contribute to prediction on what the coming ice-free decades will 
present, and how established governance precedences might be altered by new Arctic 
actors. Underlying this depiction of a changing Arctic geopolitical dynamic is an appeal 
to policy makers to remain engaged and prioritize focus on the region. 
 The first chapter drew a comparison between the last two decades of Chinese 
unilateral and bilateral development growth and the AC’s own evolving membership, in 
order to determine the AC’s continued relevancy vis-à-vis a rising China. The study 
found that China is heavily involved in establishing itself as a credible, competent, and 
“respectful major country” in Arctic geopolitics. China’s approach is varied, ranging 
from simple branding within its “Near-Arctic State” moniker to more nuanced, 
Constructivist-based “norm entrepreneurship” where heavy investment in polar science 
and infrastructure development is designed to promote bilateral agreements with AC 
member states. Chapter 1 furthermore determined China is likely to continue to view 
cooperation within and outside the AC as one source of strategic legitimacy. Meanwhile, 
with the recent inclusion of environmental and transportation sector NGOs, the AC will 
largely continue to function relatively effectively if not increase in international value, 
given its attempt at scoping beyond its historical focus on environmental sustainability. 
However, alternative regional forums that better reflect widening interpretations of Arctic 
development and sustainability are growing, and China is heavily involved in promoting 
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and interacting within these knowledge network constructs. Increasing Arctic investment 
by global interests over the coming decades may require an updated, more inclusive and 
comprehensive organizational model similar to the Antarctic Treaty system. The Arctic 
and Antarctic differ significantly, but one aspect of the Antarctic regime is particularly 
applicable: it is designed to prevent territorial state dominance over related policy, 
placing influence instead on individual state scientific contribution rather than on 
territorial sovereignty. Such a dynamic would be welcomed by China and a growing host 
of new regional powers, yet would challenge the territorial status quo of Arctic littoral 
states. 
 The Greenland case study, presented in Chapter 2, illustrated the Arctic’s 
changing regional to international focus and overall framing in relation to U.S., Chinese, 
Danish, indigenous, and to some extent other IO interests. It also drew attention to the 
historically-excluded indigenous populations’ own methods of altering the status quo, 
which includes gravitation towards regional outsiders like China. Using a political-
anthropology approach to assist in predicting which entities might occupy an advantaged 
position in Greenland following its eventual independence, the study finds contrasts 
between China, the U.S., and Denmark’s engagement strategies. China has made 
significant inroads into Greenland, leveraging relative cultural awareness; tangible 
infrastructure project proposals that would develop air, sea port, and communications 
facilities; and education development that closely align with Greenland’s needs. A non-
military focused, infrastructure investment approach aligns in many respects with 
Greenland’s expressed desires to exploit its mineral resources to aid in achieving 
independence. The U.S. and NATO partner Denmark have long viewed Greenland in 
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purely strategic terms, given its optimal position in the center of the North Atlantic. This 
strategic perspective ignores the complexities of the island’s Inuit culture, especially 
pacifist ideology, and the population’s overall anti-Dane sentiment.  
 There are signs the U.S. is evolving towards a more Greenland-friendly policy 
design, although the U.S.’s own Arctic prioritization shows great irregularity and its 
strategic end state is believed by most Greenlanders to still be self-centered. Since the 
2009 signing of the Greenland-Denmark Self-Government Agreement and 2013 Large 
Scale Projects Act, Greenland’s independence movement has changed from one 
principally motivated by “moral,” anti-colonial beliefs to one focused on sustainable 
development.337 It is likely too early to say how these dynamics will result in future 
influence; however, this chapter concludes that close policy attention to Greenlander’s 
actual needs —and bypassing Denmark in future negotiations—likely holds the keys to 
success. China has already cautiously attempted this, and was rewarded by Greenland 
with unprecedented mining access and additional infrastructure development 
opportunities. However, the recent joint efforts by Denmark and the U.S. to suppress 
Chinese activities on the island continues to demonstrate a colonial attitude to a 
population striving for full independence. The exclusion-peripheralization dynamic in 
Greenland is thus more complicated than simply degrading Chinese influence, 
Greenlanders too remain partial outsiders in engineering their own future. Future 
interactions between these two unique excluded entities, as well as a host of other 
potential collaborators such as the EU and other NATO states, are worthy of greater 
study.  
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 The final chapter addresses Arctic exclusion-peripheralization theory in two ways. 
First as an unintended consequence of U.S.-led offensive diplomatic action occurring 
outside of the region that nonetheless affects the Arctic, and secondly within inter-state, 
regional relations. Using political anthropology as a contextual background, this chapter 
demonstrates the significance of contemporary Sino-Russian Arctic partnership, brought 
about by mutual Western distrust, and catalyzed by U.S.-led sanctions imposed following 
Crimea’s annexation. Despite residual wariness on China’s growing regional and global 
power, and Russia’s persistent exclusionary tendencies, this chapter found cooperative 
behavior between China and Russia is likely to strengthen as long as both states continue 
to see strategic and commercial promise in the relationship. Once again, China’s use of 
various instruments of influence is succeeding in changing established Arctic norms, 
granting it peripheral entry into an otherwise exclusionary Russian cultural and political 
environment. Chapter 3 concludes that it is in Russia’s NSR region where China has most 
clearly achieved its Arctic end state, establishing itself as a crucial asset across vital 
commercial sectors, and readying the geopolitical landscape for an even greater lucrative 
and influential future. This includes potential participation in more global discourse over 
international sea laws and undersea territorial expansion, among other polar issues that 
will increasingly arise with environmental change. This chapter’s inclusion of the 
historical cameo of the British treaty port system, ironically set in 19th century China, 
demonstrates an historical precedent of how world powers construct and maintain 
‘territory’ outside of areas of sovereign control. In the 21st century geopolitical landscape, 
China is now working in much the same way, perhaps aided in small part by its own 
experience as a subject of 19th century manipulation by extra-territorial powers. 
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 Numerous conclusions can be drawn from these chapter’s findings, assisting in 
greater Arctic policy development and furthering future studies in Arctic international 
affairs. These include analysis on theoretical alternative governance structures, the use of 
political-anthropology to steer regional engagement strategies, and potential state 
leveraging of both sides of the exclusion-peripheralization equation. As the Arctic 
becomes more globalized in the coming decades, scholars caution the AC and laws 
governing the region may be incapable of preventing commercial and other exploitive 
practices from overwhelming the far north. They point to the Antarctic Treaty as a 
potential model for a new governance regime that could add further binding protections 
to the open, 2.8 million square kilometer Arctic Ocean, as well as better define former 
historically ice-covered areas currently included under UNCLOS Article 234. As Chapter 
1 discusses, the Antarctic differs significantly from the Arctic in terms of basic 
geography, commercial relevancy, lack of indigenous peoples, and well-established 
national territories. However, as a myriad of political, economic, legal, and security 
concerns begin to routinely enter the Arctic space, existing regional governance systems 
appear insufficient to handle the demand. Oran Young, perhaps the most prolific scholar 
assessing the AC’s continued relevancy, sums up future concerns in his statement, “the 
Arctic Council is too big to handle some problems, yet too small to handle others.”338 
Young introduces several limitations to initiating an Arctic Treaty modeled after the 
Antarctic’s system. First among these is the current and persistent objection of the Arctic-
5, whose sovereignty and influence are threatened by such an internationalized concept. 
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Young concludes that a “regime complex” combining existing sector and issue-specific 
organizations or laws, and most importantly offering new regional actors a more 
proactive voice, may be a more appropriate fit.339 However, the challenge of negotiating 
established states’ exclusionary motivations persists. 
 This thesis contributes to both sides of the debate over the merits of using an 
Antarctic Treaty model to improve Arctic governance. However, it contends establishing 
an appropriately sized and representative central entity to synchronize the individual 
motivations of a regime complex across the Arctic space, would be highly difficult. In 
addition to Young’s list, this thesis promotes counterarguments that an Arctic Treaty 
might also be limited by its binding nature as compared to the AC’s current “soft” law 
advocacy approach,340 effective enforcement of such a treaty’s numerous provisions 
across such an arduous and already contested environment, and the objections of 
indigenous groups and other sustainable development stakeholders to treaties preventing 
commercial activity. In addition to adding more robust environmental protections to the 
open Arctic Ocean, a major theoretical upside to the establishment of an Arctic Treaty 
would be its more egalitarian approach to influence, seen already in more fragmented 
peripheral structures and epistemic communities. The Antarctic Treaty was designed to 
do just this, elevating scientific contribution rather than state power or territorial holdings 
as the primary metric for state primacy. A similarly-engineered system could perhaps 
mitigate the peripheral dispersement of Arctic influence, currently seen in development 
of new forums and bilateral agreements outside of the AC with varying influences on 
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state policies. Unlike the Antarctic; however, an Arctic system would need to include 
commercial interests to be accepted by the majority of party states and indigenous 
groups. Inclusion also might aid in improving commercial project transparency, and 
ideally in better regulation of such activities. 
 Chapter 2 and 3’s political-anthropology studies introduce more subtle elements 
for consideration in policy development. In the Greenland example, this thesis noted the 
U.S.’s belated recognition of Greenland’s culturally-based independence needs versus 
tailored and sensitive Chinese approaches. The U.S. must recognize leadership in the 
Arctic encompasses all of its own traditional frames: human and environmental security, 
economic development, international institutionalism, and strategic territory. The U.S.’s 
April 2020 aid package to Greenland and previous Obama Administration-era efforts to 
include Greenland in regional security and scientific engagements are steps in the right 
direction. The 2020 aid package comes in parallel with the establishment of a new U.S. 
consulate in Nuuk and nominally focuses on infrastructure, education, and resource 
development. However, given that the funds were funneled to the U.S. State Department, 
rather than provided directly to Greenland itself, makes predicting future influence 
outcomes more difficult, especially given the precedence of inconsistent U.S. Arctic 
prioritization.341 Consequences of U.S. and Danish exclusionary practices towards recent 
Chinese development efforts in Greenland are likely too early to predict. However, from 
Greenland’s perspective, such external and post-colonial influence in their affairs 
contributes to longstanding mistrust over each states’ intentions and support to its 
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independence. China meanwhile, appears willing to make concessions regarding its 
strategic goals for the island, overtly maintaining its “peaceful rise” and minimizing 
potential controversies, while still benefitting in the short term from its Greenland mining 
investments.  
 Exclusion-peripheralization theory is also applicable to development of 
international and U.S. policy for Russia and China. Post-Crimea sanctions and other 
punitive diplomatic measures are arguably merited, allowing for enforcement of 
international behavioral norms. However, their long-term effects upon various 
international systems are worthy of additional study. Western sanctions are just one 
recent driver of growing Sino-Russian partnership in the Arctic and Eurasian theaters. 
Much of this relationship is affected by the state of respective bilateral relations with the 
U.S. The ongoing trade war with China is another factor incentivizing new partnerships 
that are less advantageous to the U.S. America’s Indo-Pacific theater alliances and 
longstanding military presence certainly represent other, less flexible factors. The Arctic 
offers opportunities to improve U.S. relationships with both states, while simultaneously 
maintaining more stringent national strategies in other regions. As noted in Chapter 3, 
Russia’s domestic institutions focusing on the Arctic contrast significantly with its more 
aggressive central political forces. Russia’s engrained Arctic institutionalism thus 
continues to offer potential paths for proactive engagement and cooperation, potentially 
even as a “track two” diplomatic avenue for negotiating more controversial subjects like 
arms control. Russia’s traditional exclusionary state character could also be used to the 
U.S.’s advantage if a future need arises to counter China in the region. On the flip side of 
the exclusion-peripheralization coin, the U.S. should take a more active role in Arctic 
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peripheral forums in which China participates, while improving its own standing in the 
AC. China’s use of science-diplomacy will likely continue to serve as one of its methods 
for gaining greater Arctic influence, and the U.S. cannot adequately monitor this by 
taking an outside or passing interest in Arctic affairs. Partnership or joint participation in 
climate science related Arctic activities for example would assist larger transparency 
building efforts, while furthering global security interests.  
 This thesis sought to provide a wide-ranging discussion on contemporary Arctic 
international affairs; however, it is far from comprehensive. Potential for updated case 
studies abound in this newly globalizing region. Each bilateral agreement between China 
and regional states, surveyed in Chapter 1, offers an opportunity for examination of the 
continuing evolution of Arctic geopolitics at either micro or macro scales. The aspirations 
of the region’s indigenous peoples can certainly not be presumed to be monolithic, and 
their very real human security concerns vis-à-vis environmental, commercial, and 
governance changes merit continual academic and policy redressal. China is not the only 
extra-regional state increasing its influence in the Arctic. While thus far it appears to 
embrace the Arctic’s status quo of cooperative behavior, in most policy rhetoric and in 
actions, further study on the interactions between it and other emerging Arctic powers 
deserves greater scrutiny than afforded here. Arctic political anthropology offers yet more 
avenues for research, especially in how it can be used to craft better policy or diplomatic 
approaches towards state and non-state Arctic entities. History’s lessons continue to be 
applicable to modern globalization. As the U.S. and international community continue to 
monitor China’s growth, further study on different forms of ‘empire’, and the origins of 
China’s own concept of globalization are worthy of detailed scrutiny. A wealth of 
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literature exists exploring historical aspects of international political economy, but more 
could be done in finding additional analogies to contemporary Arctic geopolitics. 
 Despite a relative wealth of English language academic and policy literature on 
the Arctic, including those based on Chinese, Inuit, and Russian primary sources, this 
study was contextually limited to English only journals. Some reports produced by 
Chinese and Russian scholarship are not published in English journals, or for a Western 
audience, and more can be done to bring these to an international audience. Updated 
studies, similar to those done previously by Babin and Lasserre, Ping and Lanteigne, and 
Kossa342 analyzing the relationship between Chinese polar investment and larger strategic 
intentions would also be beneficial. As addressed in Chapter 2, this thesis’s language and 
cultural context limitations also extends to other groups like the Arctic’s indigenous 
peoples. While a variety of English language articles, based on interviews of Greenland’s 
political elites or polling data, were used to produce the background for Greenland’s 
independence movement, this thesis does not consider these a definitive compilation of 
all Inuit perspectives, and certainly not the entire Arctic indigenous diaspora. With the 
combined forces of climate and geopolitical change already affecting Arctic indigenous 
communities, more should be done to bring their very real human security plight to the 
forefront of policy discussion. 
 In regards to climate change and related geopolitical conditions, it is important to 
underline that timelines for events included here are nearly impossible to accurately 
predict. This study is based on the most recent studies given credibility through inclusion 
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in U.S. policy documents. These forecast the occurrence of significant environmental 
change in the Arctic over the next quarter century. While related human behavioral 
changes are already accelerating, other aspects of Arctic geopolitical development, such 
as monumental changes in global governance, may take much longer depending on 
various climate change factors, and will require continuous redressal.  
 This study focused on China’s Arctic rise, and from an examination of solely 
regional data, furthered a theory of exclusion-peripheralization. However, such a theory 
requires much more evidence along a global-scale before it could be regarded as widely 
applicable. Exclusion-peripheralization theory is also based on state reaction to physical, 
territorial-based practices, but as discussed, territory can represent more than simply 
sovereign lands and waterways. Therefore, future studies involving exclusion-
peripheralization theory should examine examples of both physical and knowledge or 
commercial-based ‘territories’ and related international influence structures. 
 We end our discussion with several questions that will continue to evolve along 
with Arctic human and physical change. How will science or knowledge-based ‘territory’ 
supplant traditional concepts of territorial-based legitimacy in international governance 
systems in the Arctic and elsewhere? How might political anthropology shape future 
interactions between established and emerging states in the far north? And finally, how 
will the cyclic process of Arctic globalization continue to be manifested? All of these 
play into an enduring Arctic motif as a region of complex interests, specifically of 
exploitation versus sustainability and competition versus cooperation. This thesis’s 
presentation of case studies on contemporary Sino-Nordic, Inuit, and Russian 
collaboration demonstrated these phenomena within a larger international backdrop, 
 
 133 
including the U.S. This thesis concludes that China’s Arctic actions, exemplified by its 
investment in polar science, infrastructure and maritime agreements with individual 
Arctic states, and general norm-construction, are designed to establish a lasting, albeit 
non-territorial presence that will shape the Arctic and international politics for decades to 
come. Simply excluding this emerging actor will continue to result in greater peripheral 
systems of influence. It is far more advantageous to acknowledge this changing 
geopolitical region, and astutely engage with China and other emerging Arctic powers. 
Disregarding the new face of the Arctic avoids the promises of Fridtjof Nansen’s appeal 
for international cooperation, and ignores modern analysis on the region’s unique ability 
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